



**REPUBLIC OF RWANDA**



**NATIONAL UNITY AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION**

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# **RWANDA RECONCILIATION BAROMETER**

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**UNDP - DFID**



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## ACRONYMS

CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
IJR	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
IRDP	Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace
MINALOC	Ministry of Local Administration
NURC	National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
PSGG	Programme to Strengthen Good Governance
RPF	Rwandese Patriotic Front
RRB	Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer
SARB	South African Reconciliation Barometer
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US\$	United States of America Dollar

### **N.B USE OF “ETHNIC GROUPS” TERMINOLOGY**

**This terminology has been used to refer to Hutu, Tusti and Twa but, on scientific basis, Hutu, Tusti and Twa in Rwanda are not Ethnic groups**

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## FOREWORD

For more than sixteen years, Rwanda has been and is still embarking on the way of reconciliation after many decades of divisionism which culminated into the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. Even though our past tragedy has passed, Rwandans have to heal the wounds of the past. They have to do more in rebuilding the needed social cohesion and the recommendable human being under supportive good governance.

Given the situation where the country is coming from characterized by a collapsed society and state, we needed for long time to measure in the appropriate manner on going process of unity and reconciliation in order to evaluate and focus to main challenges if any. On this note, the Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer (RRB) is addressing that issue as a measurement tool that is assessing the progress in the field of the Reconciliation in Rwanda.

Variables in relation with reconciliation have been identified and extended to related indicators which have enabled the drawing of a comprehensive questionnaire that was submitted to a sampled population. The research findings are very recommendable with some gaps to fill given the fact that the Reconciliation is a process which was started and still on going.

We have achieved a lot but we have not yet reached the desired level. For such reasons, Rwandans need to speed up the building of a prosperous and peaceful country. What we have achieved in the last sixteen years must energize us to go further in cleaning up the understanding and the behaviors which could be a barrier of unity and reconciliation among Rwandans.

We are witnessing that Rwanda is in a new era, making new records of togetherness, mutual respect and complementarity. The Miss interpretation and falsification of history that saved to spread divisionism among Rwandans are over. To day Rwandans are proud to be what they are and are in the way to make themselves what they want to be. The unity and reconciliation process has shown recommendable results for which Rwandans are proud of.

GOD bless Rwanda

Bishop John RUCYAHANA

Chairperson

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer (RRB) project is in line with the NURC's mandate to promote national unity and reconciliation in a post-genocide Rwanda, and represents an attempt to deepen its understanding of how ordinary citizens perceive and react to efforts aimed at promoting these objectives. The study has emerged from the need for a quantitative monitoring tool that would allow the Commission to access the most current public opinion on the progress and pitfalls of the country's national reconciliation programme. Such a tool would allow it to respond in a more targeted way to social fault lines and, in the longer term, may serve as an early warning system to potential sources of societal friction. Public opinion around national reconciliation has, thus far, been an under-researched aspect in the search to understand national unity and reconciliation processes in Rwanda, and this report presents the results of exploratory research on this area.

Inspired from, among others, the conceptual framework and methodology of the South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB), which has measured public opinion on national reconciliation in that country since 2003, the Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer (RBB) is a national public opinion survey that intends to track progress on the road to reconciliation in Rwanda by means of a structured quantitative research instrument. The survey consisted of face-to-face interviews with approximately three thousand Rwandan citizens, across all thirty districts of the country, to represent a sampling universe of all citizens who have reached the legal age of majority (approximately 4,963,000 adults). Due to the unavailability of population data on the district level following territorial reforms, the project employed a multi-stage probability sampling methodology. Sampling stratification was conducted across different levels: district; sector; cell; village; household; and according to gender (by ensuring that every second interview was conducted with a woman). A quantitative data collection approach was used, through the form of face-to-face interviews administered in Kinyarwanda based on a structured questionnaire.

In preparation the research team, through a series of consultations with experts inside and outside of Rwanda, distilled six key hypotheses that are critical to the state of-, and future prospects for national unity and reconciliation in the country. The hypotheses, their indicators, and public responses to their measurement are summarised below:

1. **Political Culture:** The first hypothesis posited that if citizens view political structures, institutions, values and leadership as legitimate and effective, national reconciliation is more likely to occur. Survey questions and statements therefore measured confidence in public institutions, trust in leadership, and the respect of rule of law and courts. In brief, the results indicate moderate to high levels ( more than 90%) of

trust in public institutions overall (compared to generally lower levels of trust in non-governmental- and private institutions), in the country's political leadership. The survey also recorded significantly high percentages of respondents who indicated participation or willingness to participate in citizen forums (more than 85%). The major exception to this has been in regard with the willingness to participate in actions closely associated with protest or dispute (less than 50%).

2. **Human security:** The second hypothesis contended that if citizens feel materially, physically, and culturally secure, they will be more willing to commit themselves to national reconciliation processes. This hypothesis is based on the contention that under conditions of scarcity in a society with a history of ethnic friction, conflict is more likely to arise along such ethnic lines. The indicators that were used included: physical security; economic security; equality of treatment and access; freedom of expression; and respondents' hope for the future. Respondents reported relatively high levels of physical and economic security; a majority felt that great strides have been made in all respects since 1994; and there was significant approval of the overall direction of the country (more than 90% overall). It was, however, evident that positive public evaluation for human security was less emphatic than that for most other hypotheses tested.
3. **Citizenship and Identity:** The third hypothesis suggested that in contexts where a shared sense of citizenship and identity, as well as tolerance for diversity exists, national reconciliation is more likely to occur. It explores the indicators of national and individual identity, attitudes regarding citizenship, and the prevalence of shared cultural values. Respondents exhibited a strong preference for a national Rwandan identity (more than 97% overall) and national values, but many participants also incorrectly believed that references to ethnicity or ethnic groups are prohibited by law or instruction in Rwanda. Other identities that respondents were likely to associate with were religious-based, value-based and geographically-based
4. **Understanding the past:** This hypothesis is based on the assumption that if Rwandans are able to confront the sources of historical social divisions, reconciliation is more likely to occur, particularly between those who found themselves on opposing sides during the genocide. The study identified the degree to which a shared understanding of the country's history exists (through the acknowledgement of facts or the truth) as a critical indicator of the extent to which the country is coming to terms with its past. The results show that a considerable majority (87.0%) agreed that in the sixteen years following the genocide, most of the major issues related to its causes and consequences have been frankly discussed and

understood. However, a significant percentage of respondents (almost 39.9%) believe that there are people in Rwandan society that would still perpetrate acts of genocide if given the opportunity.

5. **Transitional justice:** The fifth hypothesis contends that if parties to conflict are convinced that they got proper justice, there is greater likelihood for reconciliation. This was measured by a range of indicators that are associated with the broader field of transitional justice. Most respondents felt that significant strides were made in terms of the creation of domestic transitional justice measures. As far as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is concerned, the survey found that although most Rwandans were aware of its purpose and evaluated it positive (nearly 60%), close to a quarter were not in a position to wage an opinion on its effectiveness.
6. **Social cohesion:** The final hypothesis proposes that if trust increases between Rwandan citizens, and particularly those on different sides of the genocide, reconciliation is more likely to occur. As a result the survey presented respondents with a number of statements and questions relating to social distance, tolerance, and trust. The data suggests that citizens sense significant progress in terms of forging social cohesion in the wake of the 1994 genocide (more than 92% overall). Responses suggest positive development (more than 80% overall) in terms of inter-ethnic relations and interactions, as well as the levels of trust that exist between communities that found themselves on different sides during the genocide.

The report concludes with a discussion of the major findings, policy recommendations, and suggestions for further research. In terms of methodological lessons learned, the immediate context on the pre-election mood was found to be less than ideal, given that the very nature of such campaigns are to sway or reinforce opinions from those citizens may normally hold. In addition, the RBB questionnaire raises a number of sensitive issues that may require supplementary qualitative approach in the form of focus group discussion.

In terms of policy-oriented recommendations, it was evident that even though citizens showed significant levels of confidence and trust in state institutions and political leadership to deliver on their mandate, responses were more reserved in relation to evaluations relating to human security, and particularly so where it is concerned with respondents' sense of economic security is concerned. Since most forms of social conflict has got economic roots, it is imperative that attention should be paid to this finding. While economic growth and personal economic security may very often be contingent upon the whims of the global economy, it nevertheless remain incumbent upon the state to

guarantee equal access to government resources to all citizens, and to ensure that the country's economic and natural assets are managed transparently so as to avoid any charges of ethnic- or any other sectional form of favouritism.

In conclusion, the RRB instrument has set baseline indicators for future surveys. The results that it has rendered should, as a result, also be regarded as baseline findings that do not point to an improvement or decline in the evaluation of the particular indicators. This can only be done when subsequent surveys are being compared against this first round. The report, therefore, recommends that the NURC endeavours to ensure a regular update of this instrument in order to track the current, but also new indicators, should emerge. In addition, and as mentioned above, it is recommended that this quantitative data should be supplemented by qualitative approaches, such as focus groups, to further probe the factors that inform these survey responses.

## I INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Background and context

From the 1950's through the 1990's, Rwanda came into international focus for a host of reasons, including ongoing conflict, a record of severe human abuses, and the actions of successive governments that seriously violated the rights of citizens with impunity. Dating back to the colonial period, and throughout periods of conflict and regime change, successive governments' entrenched deep-set divisions within Rwandan society, particularly along ethnic lines. These divisions were further enforced through the enacting and implementation of dehumanising law and policy, inequality of treatment, and differential access to amenities, basic services and the protection of the state. As a consequence, many Rwandans left the country as refugees, settling in neighbouring states and further abroad.

During the 1990's, Rwanda's political instability and unrest was further exacerbated by the country's high levels of poverty, its tenuous relations within the region, and increased political opposition, both within and outside of the country's borders, culminating in military clashes between the regime of President Juvenal Habyarimana and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). Although efforts to promote peace and an end to armed conflict appeared to be on track with the signing of the 1993 Arusha Peace Accord, this peace proved fleeting. Instead, violence quickly escalated to a massive scale and the final phase of the genocide claimed over a million lives of Tutsi and fellow Hutu who found themselves on the victims' side for number of reasons.

The genocide of 1994 shred all that was left of the Rwandan social fabric that provided a degree of social cohesion prior to the genocide. In its aftermath the country was left with a collapsed system of governance, a highly polarised society characterised by distrust and fear between citizens, and a lack of shared national unity.

Fortunately, this sad chapter in African history is being left behind through forward-looking reconstruction efforts and the will of Rwanda's people to re-shape and redefine reconciliation and social reconstruction, from a perspective that emphasises bottom-up approaches and development from within the country.

With the return of peace, the country's major challenges were firstly, to build its governance infrastructure, but this was highly contingent upon the second challenge, national reconciliation, which was needed to restore national unity and political stability. At the time few were willing to wage their bets on success in surmounting either of these challenges. Yet, when compared to several of its East African neighbours, Rwanda today enjoys a substantial level of political stability. These factors, together with the country's robust economic growth in recent years, suggest that its government and public institutions, such

as NURC, have by and large been successful in arresting the major sources of domestic instability.

## 1.2. Promoting National Unity and Reconciliation

Even prior to the 1994 genocide, and with the 1993 signing of the Arusha Peace Accord, national unity and reconciliation have been viewed as requisite priorities for the re-establishment and consolidation of democracy, peace and security, the rule of law, social cohesion and development in Rwanda. As described by the NURC, the “Arusha Peace Accords, signed in August 1993 between the then-government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, considered Unity and Reconciliation as a process that is fundamental for the stability and development of Rwanda.”<sup>1</sup>

In light of this reality, in the post-genocide period, the new Rwandan Government put in place a unique assortment of international, nation-state, homegrown, and reconciliatory mechanisms. Rwanda possesses one of the only two international criminal tribunals established since Nuremberg and Tokyo after World War II (the other being the court for the former Yugoslavia), the efforts of which have contributed substantively to the developing field of International Criminal Law.

Rwanda’s efforts to prosecute *genocidaires* may be compared with other cases where transitional justice prioritised the prosecution of perpetrators of past political atrocities. In this connection, the “Rwandan approach” to prosecute as many *genocidaires* as possible was also in line with the provisions of the Rome Treaty, that amnesties amounting to legal impunity are no longer acceptable for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. Although the Treaty was only enacted some years after the Rwanda genocide, it has, since its ratification, added momentum to international efforts to prosecute *genocidaires*.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the United Nations-sponsored International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has added significantly to international genocide case law and has been the subject of various studies.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. “Unity and Reconciliation: Understanding Unity & Reconciliation Profess 15 Years after Genocide.” *NURC Review Magazine*, p 3.

<sup>2</sup> See: [http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome\\_Statute\\_English.pdf](http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_English.pdf).

<sup>3</sup> See for example, Payam Akhavan, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment,’ *The American Journal of International Law* 90 (1996): 501–510; Payam Akhavan, ‘Justice and Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,’ *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law* 7, 2 (Spring 1997): 338; as well as Oliver Dubois, ‘Rwanda’s national criminal courts and the International Tribunal,’ *International Review of the Red Cross* 321 (1997): 718; see also International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Justice Delayed’ (Nairobi, Arusha and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 7 June 2001): 11–12, [Electronic]. Available at: [http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report\\_archive/A400442\\_02102001.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400442_02102001.pdf) [9 October 2007]; Alison Des Forges and Timothy Longman, ‘Legal responses to genocide in Rwanda’, in *My Neighbor, My Enemy*,

As complement to the activities of its domestic courts, the Rwandan government established a revamped version of the traditional Gacaca courts in June of 2002, with elected judges and a jury of the defendant's neighbours, to accelerate justice and to unburden a prison system overloaded by an estimated 130,000 alleged genocide perpetrators.<sup>4</sup>

The establishment of the NURC also represented one of Rwanda's principle non-judicial measures to promote reconciliation. With its foundations traceable to Article 24 of the Arusha Peace Accord, in the Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the RPF<sup>5</sup>, the formal establishment of the NURC was the outcome of reflection meetings convened by the Presidency in 1998-1999 to discuss a range of issues pertaining to the history of Rwanda and ways forward in the aftermath of genocide. The NURC was formally instituted in Parliament through the passing of law No 03/99 of 12 March 1999, and with the broad mandate of promoting and fostering reconciliation among Rwandans, the NURC has enjoyed political will and support from the highest political levels since its inception.

## II LITERATURE REVIEW: CONCEPTUALISING RECONCILIATION

The concept of reconciliation, and efforts to measure it quantitatively, is a relatively new research focus of increasing interest internationally, although substantive work has been carried out by the IJR in this respect, through the South African Reconciliation Barometer, conducted since 2003.

This growing importance worldwide is also confirmed by the United Nation's declaration of 2009 as the International Year of Reconciliation, in order to highlight its significance for the large numbers of countries facing post-conflict transitions.<sup>6</sup> The concept of reconciliation is extremely complex, and encapsulates a multitude of principles, variables, dimensions, and meanings. Despite strong consensus over its necessity and desirability for enduring peace,

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ed. Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 53f; Madeline H. Morris, 'The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda,' *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law* 7, 2 (Spring 1997): 363; Oomen, 'Justice Mechanisms,' 19. See also Reydam, 'The ICTR Ten Years On,' 977-988; Helena Cobban, 'The Legacies of Collective Violence: The Rwandan genocide and the limits of law,' *Boston Review* 7, 2 (April/May 2002) [Electronic]. Available at: [www.bostonreview.net/BR27.2/cobban.html](http://www.bostonreview.net/BR27.2/cobban.html) [April 2008].

<sup>4</sup> Tiemessen, A.E., 2004. "After Arusha Gacaca Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda", *African Studies Quarterly* Vol 8 Issue 1, Fall 2004.

<sup>5</sup> Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front. Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations 2006. "UN General Assembly Resolution 61/17." Available at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/495/45/PDF/N0649545.pdf?OpenElement>



there is little academic agreement over its definition, further complicating the task of measuring it within societies such as Rwanda.

The measurement of a social trend as complex as reconciliation is not uncontested. However, Amstutz (2006) suggests that quantifying aspects of progress in reconciliation should include evaluations of breadth and scope, referring to the numbers of people involved, as well as the depth and intensity of divisions, including degrees of inter-group trust and cooperation.<sup>7</sup>

James L. Gibson (2004) maintains that “truth and reconciliation are concepts that can be (and should be) measured and assessed using rigorous and systematic social science methods.” Referring to the case of post-apartheid South Africa, Gibson suggests that reconciliation can be viewed in terms of “at least four specific and perhaps even independent sub-concepts”, including: inter-racial reconciliation, including inter-group trust and the rejection of stereotypes; political tolerance; support for the principles (abstract and applied) of human rights; and, recognition and acceptance of the political institutions of the democratic South Africa<sup>8</sup>

While global attention to reconciliation is growing, Parmentier (2009) observes that the current notion of reconciliation is “closely connected” to the ground-breaking work of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) — although it had already previously featured in the ICTR’s Statute.<sup>9</sup> The principles underpinning the TRC’s approach to reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa included the needs for “understanding but not for vengeance”, for “reparation but not for retaliation”, and for “ubuntu but not for victimisation”. In Rwanda, as well as in South Africa, the process of reconciliation was posited as a form of restorative justice that would bring together perpetrators of such crimes (Apartheid and genocide) with victims and the broader public, with the goal of “correcting imbalances, restoring broken relationships with healing, harmony and reconciliation.”

## 2.1. Reconciliation in Theory

A fundamental question posed by both theorists and practitioners is whether reconciliation should be conceived as a process, or rather, as the end result of a process, or indeed both. However, often it is construed as a process that is deliberately and systematically pursued due to the desirability of its end-result.

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<sup>7</sup> Amstutz, M. R., 2006. “Is Reconciliation Possible after Genocide?: The Case of Rwanda,” *Journal of Church and State* 48(3), p. 546.

<sup>8</sup> Gibson, J.L., 2004. *Overcoming Apartheid: Can truth reconcile a divided nation?* HSRC Press and Russell Sage Foundation, Cape Town and New York, p. 4.

<sup>9</sup> Parmentier, S. “Transitional Justice and Reconciliation for International Crimes: who holds the roadmap?” *Promotio Iustitiae*, 103, March 2009, p. 66.

Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004) synthesise fourteen researchers' definitions of the reconciliation process as: "the formation or restoration of genuine peaceful relationships between societies that have been involved in intractable conflict, after its formal resolution is achieved."<sup>10</sup> This definition highlights the second major feature of reconciliation: whether seen as a process or an end, it occurs after the official conclusion to a conflict, and thus generally aims to resolve "invisible" conflict. Moreover, its focus on "societies" confirms the aim of uniting disparate groups, wherein the psychological, economic and socio-political conditions of each party are important considerations.

Kriesberg (2007) identifies the four primary dimensions of reconciliation as truth, justice, respect, and security, and states that "the degree of reconciliation varies in the extent and intensity to which all the dimensions are fulfilled."<sup>11</sup> Consistent with the findings of Bar-Tal and Bennink, Kriesberg suggests that reconciliation "generally refers to the process of developing a mutual conciliatory accommodation between enemies or formerly antagonistic groups". Further, the author adds that reconciliation "often refers to the process of moving toward a relatively cooperative and amicable relationship, typically established after a rupture in relations involving extreme injury to one or more sides in the relationship".<sup>12</sup>

I. William Zartmann, cited by Umutesi (2006), goes further and explicitly incorporates the importance of confronting the past in order to move forward and "arrive at a pacified society where free and equal individuals acknowledge each other and are capable of facing up to a history full of violent acts, and above all, are able to surmount that history."<sup>13</sup>

A number of theorists refer specifically to the process of political reconciliation, as referring to "only those relationships that are proper to the political order."<sup>14</sup> According to Amstutz (2006), "political reconciliation can be conceived as the restoration of harmonious relationships", and therefore, "to become reconciled is to overcome alienation, division, and enmity and to restore peaceful, cooperative relationships based on a shared commitment to communal solidarity."<sup>15</sup>

Like Gibson, Amstutz suggests that the "truth" is conducive to healing in deeply divided societies. However, the author also maintains that truth does not guarantee reconciliation, and that reconciliation and justice are not necessarily compatible, albeit equally important

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<sup>10</sup> Cited in Nets-Zehngut, R. "Analyzing the Reconciliation Process, *International Journal on World Peace*. Vol. XXIV No. 3, Sept. 2007, p. 55.

<sup>11</sup> Kriesberg, 6.

<sup>12</sup> Kriesberg, L., "Reconciliation: aspects, growth, and sequences." *International Journal of Peace Studies* 12(1), Spring/Summer 2007, p. 2.

<sup>13</sup> Umutesi, M-B., "Is Reconciliation between Hutus and Tutsis Possible?" *Journal of International Affairs*, Fall/Winter 2006, Vol 60(1), p. 164.

<sup>14</sup> Philpott, D. "An Ethic of Political Reconciliation," *Ethics and International Affairs*, Vol 23(4), Winter 2009, p. 392.

<sup>15</sup> Amstutz, p. 546.

goals.<sup>16</sup> The “dominant liberal peace” approach emphasises the importance of pursuing justice in post-conflict societies through the use of the courts to recover the objective, forensic truth about conflict, and punish perpetrators accordingly. Philpott (2009) stresses the importance of this approach, in defining reconciliation as a “holistic concept, [which] involves a process of restoration [of right relationships within a community] as well as a state of restoration, addresses the wide range of harms that crimes cause, and enlists the wide range of persons affected by these crimes.”<sup>17</sup>

While Philpott confirms Amstutz’s position that justice does not necessarily equate reconciliation, the author adds that “reconciliation, both as a process and as an end state, is itself a concept of justice. Its animating virtue is mercy and its goal is peace. These concepts are expressed most deeply in religious traditions, including Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.”<sup>18</sup> This implies that punitive justice and the forensic truth achieved by trials are not sufficient to ensure the other two dimensions of reconciliation, namely mutual respect and security.

Ultimately - and at times outside the scope of reconciliation theorists – ensuring security is at the heart of most national reconciliation efforts, in which both governments and citizens strive to achieve genuine and durable peace above all else. Assuring effectiveness, however, requires a conflict resolution process and peace agreement based on the basic tenets of justice, impartiality, and establishing trust between parties—which is generally both an aim and important determinant of reconciliation.<sup>19</sup>

### **III RECONCILIATION IN THE RWANDAN CONTEXT**

As outlined in the previous section, even prior to the 1994 genocide, reconciliation was viewed as an important priority for overcoming a history of conflict within Rwandan society, as captured in the 1993 Arusha Peace Accord.

The NURC has defined unity and reconciliation as “a consensus practice of citizens who have common nationality, who share the same culture and have equal rights; citizens characterized by trust, tolerance, mutual respect, equality, complementary roles/interdependence, truth, and healing of one another’s wounds inflicted by our history, with the objectives of laying a foundation for sustainable development.”<sup>20</sup> The NURC maintains that attaining unity and reconciliation among all Rwandans will require a “radical change on the part of the Rwandan society and willingness to transform Rwanda into a

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p. 542.

<sup>17</sup> Philpott, p. 392.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, p. 390.

<sup>19</sup> Nets-Zehngut, p. 57.

<sup>20</sup> Republic of Rwanda National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, 2007. “The National Policy on Unity and Reconciliation.” pp. 6-7.

reconciled and united nation in which all citizens have equal freedoms and a country that has a common vision for a better future.”<sup>21</sup>

The work of the NURC is framed historically by both the 1994 genocide, but also by Rwanda’s history of conflict, resulting from “various historical eras of bad governance characterized by divisions and discriminations based on ethnicity, religion, region of origin and nepotism which have had devastating effects on the social relations” between Rwandans.<sup>22</sup>

Furthermore, it is worth noting that unity and reconciliation processes are guided by the following principles<sup>23</sup>:

- To promote the spirit of Rwandan identity and put national interests first instead of favours based on ethnicity, blood relations, gender, religion, region of origin, etc.
- To combat the genocide and its ideology
- To strive at creating a nation governed by the rule of law and respect for human rights
- To combat any form of divisionism and discrimination
- To promote interdependence and synergy in nation building
- To multiply strive to heal one another’s physical and psychological wounds while building future interpersonal trust based on truth telling, repentance and forgiveness
- To commemorate the 1994 genocide with the aim of making “Never Again” a reality
- To strive for self-determination and passion for work

Today the NURC concentrates its attention on the following areas:

- Preparing and coordinating the national programme for the promotion of national unity and reconciliation;
- Putting in place and developing ways and means to restore and consolidate unity and reconciliation among Rwandans;
- Educating and mobilizing the population on matters relating to national unity and reconciliation;
- Carrying out Research, organizing Debates, Disseminating ideas and making Publications related to peace, national unity and reconciliation;

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid, p. 7.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p. 7.

<sup>23</sup> NURC, *The National Policy on Unity and Reconciliation*, Kigali August 2007, p.11

- Making proposals on measures that can eradicate divisions among Rwandans and to reinforce national unity and reconciliation;
- Denouncing and fighting against Acts, Writings and utterances which are intended to promote any kind of discrimination, intolerance or xenophobia; and
- Making an Annual Reports and such other reports as may be necessary on the situation of national unity and reconciliation.<sup>24</sup>

These functions have been achieved, in part, through the implementation of a number of key programmes, including: *Ingando*, which has established more than two hundred “unity and reconciliation clubs”, primarily among youth; *Itorero ry’igihugu*, focused on ensuring ongoing peace and security and improving public service delivery; and, *Igorora*, a radio broadcast, in addition to a national consultations, research and other work.<sup>25</sup>

The Reconciliation Barometer comprises one of the new programmes introduced by the NURC, in partnership with the IJR and IRDP. Although some research has been conducted on reconciliation in Rwanda during the ten years since the NURC’s inception, no studies to date have yielded comprehensive quantitative data that measures the impact of reconciliatory interventions at the national level. According to the NURC, the RRB “will be applied in measuring the indicators of the impact of unity and reconciliation right from the grassroots to the national level. The NURC is also “developing a Reconciliation Barometer Policy”, which “will support our monitoring strategies particularly how unity and reconciliation is being implemented.” Further, the NURC plans to “list all indicators of unity and reconciliation.”<sup>26</sup>

#### IV RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Rwanda’s substantial achievements over the last sixteen years are commendable, yet the relatively short period that has lapsed since the genocide must serve as a reminder that there is no room for complacency. Gains need to be consolidated and areas where potential weaknesses still exist must be identified, investigated and remedied.

When asked how Rwanda is doing in terms of its governance and pursuit for national unity and reconciliation, the country needs to have the best diagnostic tools at its disposal to identify areas of strength and aspects of weakness. A monitoring tool is required, which

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<sup>24</sup> The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, Amendment No 3 of 13/08/2008

<sup>25</sup> National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. “Unity and Reconciliation: Understanding Unity & Reconciliation Profess 15 Years after Genocide.” *NURC Review Magazine*, p 11.

<sup>26</sup> National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. “Unity and Reconciliation: Understanding Unity & Reconciliation Profess 15 Years after Genocide.” *NURC Review Magazine*, p 22.

links issues of governance and national unity and can serve as an early warning system to alert social stakeholders of potential problem areas.

A number of qualitative and quantitative studies have been conducted to illuminate issues of governance and social cohesion in Rwanda. The IRDP, one of the partners in this application, has stood at the forefront of some of these. A gap does however still exist in terms of quantitative survey research that combines and links the questions of national unity and reconciliation with issues of governance. Public perception around national reconciliation, in particular, remains an under-researched aspect of this sphere of investigation. There is therefore a need to examine the sentiments of ordinary citizens towards national reconciliation. Has it been strengthened, and if so, to what extent has it contributed to the development of sense of national unity. Moreover, to what extent have institutions of governance, such as the NURC contributed to the current state of affairs? In sum, it is critical to know whether ordinary Rwandans feel the country has moved in the direction of reconciliation and unity or whether it still struggles to come to terms with its past. What are the essential obstacles and opportunities for reconciliation? Above all, what can be done to address these concerns?

One major challenge is the absence of comprehensive, reliable and coherent information, both in terms of the actual circumstances and in terms of the perceptions of reality. And even when the data is physically available in state archives, university libraries and various government departments, the data is often of such a complex and technical nature that it remains effectively inaccessible to the ordinary citizen. This can result in decisions and actions, whether by government, aid agencies or the business community, that are made without factoring in a number of social and political realities that are critical to the understanding of the context upon which they have bearing.

The RRB has endeavoured to find answers to these key questions and to make such information broadly accessible to relevant stakeholders. It examines how Rwandans from all spheres of society react towards one another and how they interact with key governance institutions, specifically as they pertain to questions of national unity and reconciliation.

#### **4.1. Project Objective**

The objective of the project is to contribute towards the process of national unity and reconciliation through an improved understanding of how ordinary Rwandans perceive and respond to efforts to promote it. It is hoped that such a study will prompt direct interventions, but also indirectly stimulate national debates around unity and reconciliation and the role that institutions of governance ought to play in this regard. As such, the project entailed a comprehensive and systematic attempt to determine perceived successes and shortcomings related to national reconciliation and the institutions tasked with its

promotion, and in the process shift discourses on its enhancement to the centre of policy-making processes.

This information is presented to the NURC in this document, but ideally it should also be disseminated more broadly to policy makers, civil society organisations and ordinary people through a targeted multi-media campaign. The knowledge, understanding and insight that the Reconciliation Barometer can generate will have the potential to equip organisations and institutions working at the coal face of the promotion of reconciliation and the protection of human rights to focus and improve their interventions. As a result the impact of the Reconciliation Barometer will be particularly evident in the quality of the national discourse on the issues that the survey addresses.

Beyond this comprehensive survey report, further briefings and/or reports may be arranged, depending on the availability of the partners. To maximise the utility of the survey as a national resource, it may therefore also be worth considering a number of briefings to civil society organisations that are working in this sphere.

## **4.2. Quantitative measurement of reconciliation**

When embarking on the task of 'measuring' a process that is as subjective and contested as reconciliation, certain inherent shortcomings have to be accepted. These range from the need to oversimplify certain dimensions of the reconciliation process for the sake of measurability, to having to focus on only a select few facets of this complex and multi-dimensional concept.

The need to conduct rigorous empirical research on the progression of the national reconciliation process exists and, in fact, is greater than the inherent difficulties in embarking this task. But, as is the case with all exploratory research (whether of a quantitative or qualitative nature), a cautionary approach should be employed. The obvious danger of excessive reductionism in translating such a complex process in relation to a handful of critical indicators is recognized. On the contrary, this research recognizes the definitional and contextual ambiguity of the process. It is a first attempt at some necessary comparable quantification of the national reconciliation process.

Additionally it is important to bear in mind that the results of the first series of surveys should not be interpreted as representative of particular trends. Even in cases where change has been tremendous, three measurements – particularly across quite a short time period - do not provide sufficient evidence to assume the presence of a trend. Such changes should be treated as fluctuations; the absence or presence of trends will be confirmed by data emanating from later rounds of the survey. The results of the first rounds should at best be interpreted as snapshots of the current public sentiment on the issues that are being measured.

## V RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer is a national public opinion survey that measures progress on the road to reconciliation by means of a structured quantitative research instrument. The survey consisted of face-to-face interviews with approximately three thousand Rwandan citizens, across all thirty districts of the country.

### 5.1. Population Data

Rwanda is a geographically small and densely-populated country, with a surface area of 26,338 square kilometres and a national population that is predominantly rural and highly youthful.

Its most recent national census, the General Census of Population and Housing, was conducted in 2002, and estimated the national population at close to 8.2 million persons. Women marginally outnumbered men, with the national population made up of approximately 4.2 million females and 3.9 million males. The Report on the Preliminary Results of the 2002 census measures population density in 11 provinces and Kigali city. Ruhengeri Province in the north of the country (894,179 residents, or 11.0% of the national population) was identified as the most populous area of the country, and Umutara in the east of the country as the least populous (423,642 residents, or 5.2% of the national population).<sup>27</sup>

However, in 2006 Rwanda underwent a programme of territorial re-demarcation, resulting in a reduction of the number of provinces to 5 (Kigali City and the North, South, East and West provinces). Thirty districts were also delineated around the country.

Although some initial baseline surveys have been conducted in these recently-established districts, full population data disaggregated according to district is not yet available.<sup>28</sup>

As of 2008, World Bank estimates place the national population at 9,720,694,<sup>29</sup> with an average population growth rate of 2.8% between 2005 and 2010.<sup>30</sup>

The population is relatively young, and United Nations data indicates that 42.8% of the population in 2008 was aged 0-14, whereas women and men older than 60 comprised only

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<sup>27</sup> Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and National Census Commission, 2007. "National Census Service: The General Census of Population and Housing, Report on the Preliminary Results." Available at: <http://www.statistics.gov.rw/>

<sup>28</sup> According to the National Institute of Statistics, baseline surveys have been conducted in the Southern province (Kamonyi, Muhanga, Nyamagabe, Nyanza, Gisagara, Nyaruguru, Ruhango, and Huye districts), the Western province (Nyabihu, Rutsiro, Rubavu, Nyamasheke, Ngororero, Karongi, and Rusizi districts) and in Kigali city (Nyarugenge, Gasabo, and Kicukiro districts). See <http://www.statistics.gov.rw/>.

<sup>29</sup> World Bank. Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/rwanda>

<sup>30</sup> UNData Country Profile: Rwanda.



4.5% and 3.2% of the population respectively. Also as of 2008, numbers of women nationally were somewhat higher than men, with a sex ratio of 93.4 men per 100 women. Life expectancy at birth remains low, at 47.8 years for women and 44.6 years for men.<sup>31</sup>

As of 2007, only 18% of the Rwanda population was characterised as urban by the United Nations, although the urban population growth rate of 4.2% between 2005 and 2010 surpassed the rural population growth rate of 2.4% over the same period.<sup>32</sup>

## 5.2. Sample

Due to the territorial reforms introduced in the period following Rwanda's most recent census, and the limited baseline data available as yet on the district level, a reliable national sample frame is not available. Therefore, a multi-stage probability sampling methodology was utilised, with the goal of achieving a representative cross-section of Rwandan citizens.

The sample universe for the Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer includes all citizens who have reached the legal age of majority, or 18 years and older. Data from the National ID Project<sup>33</sup> places the national population aged 17 or less at 4,466,587 and that aged 18 and elder at 5,452,788, on the 13<sup>th</sup> January, 2010.

In consideration of required precision, resources and operational constraints, a sample of 3,000 adults was drawn from the sample universe (5,452,788), with every effort to ensure random sampling and with the goal that every adult citizen had "an equal and known chance of being chosen for inclusion in the sample."<sup>34</sup>

## 5.3. Sampling Stratification

The primary stratification for the sample was at the district level, and as a baseline survey and in the absence of a sampling frame, face-to-face interviews were conducted in all of the thirty districts (Uturere) created through the 2006 territorial reform programme. However, following this stratification, random sampling methods were introduced to ensure representation. Sampling occurred as follows:

- Within each of the 30 districts (Uturere) nationally, 3 sector (umurenge) were randomly selected (of a total of 416 across the country);
- Within each of the randomly selected sectors (Imirenge), 1 cell (akagari) was randomly selected;

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<sup>31</sup> UNData Country Profile: Rwanda.


<sup>32</sup> UNData Country Profile: Rwanda. Available at: <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Rwanda>

<sup>33</sup> National ID Project is a Gouvernement-led institution whose objective is to provide every Rwandan citizen with National ID that is implemented on electronic card. This ID contains information about the Rwandan citizen such as civil information, health information, traffic information, etc.

<sup>34</sup> Afrobarometer. Available at: <http://www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.html>.

- Within each of the randomly selected cells (Utugari), 1 village was randomly selected;
- On village level, 33 households were randomly selected in each of the 2 first selected villages, and 34 households in the 3rd selected village for a total of 100 households per district. Households constituted the primary unit of analysis.

**Figure 1: Sampling Stratification**



The average village is comprised of approximately 150 households. In many villages, each household or plot has a unique number, though this is not always the case. Upon arrival in the village, interviewers and fieldwork supervisors met with the village leader to introduce the purpose of the research. Village leaders are often very knowledgeable about residents, and were able to provide the list of households or householder's names. Interviewers then randomly selected 45 households from the total number (by drawing random numbers "from a hat"). A larger number of households than required were randomly selected in each village, for replacement purposes. (For further details on village sampling, see Annex 1: *Selected sectors, cells and Villages*).

At the village level, further stratification was introduced according to gender. Interviewers visited each of the randomly selected households to conduct interviews with household residents (not visitors) of 18 years and older. Every second interview was conducted with a woman<sup>35</sup>, and all interviews were conducted with citizens of Rwanda. In instances in which there were more than one possible interview participant, meaning more than one adult of the correct gender for that household, the participant was randomly selected from available adults.

Since the definition of a household may differ from one cultural context to another, it was necessary to ensure that conceptual clarity exists as far as this term is concerned. The European Social Survey, for example, defines a household as “one person living alone, or a group of people living at the same address (and have that address as their only or main residence), who either share at least one main meal a day or share the living accommodation (or both).”<sup>36</sup> The World Values Survey described respondents as “belonging to the same household if they spend more than 5 nights per week in the said household”<sup>37</sup>, while Afrobarometer regards it as “a group of people who presently eat together from the same pot.”<sup>38</sup>

The working definition of a household in the RRB is that of the Rwanda General Census of the Population and Housing (2002). This census gives the following categories of households and definitions:

1. The private household – a group of persons who live in the same dwelling, share the same budget and have meals together, or one person living separately. The members of a household should not necessarily be in family or marital relationship.
2. The family household – a household comprising two or more persons who are in marital or family relationship. It can be spouses/cohabitants with or without a child (-ren) or one of parents with a child (-ren) living alone or together with other persons, etc.
3. The non-family household – a household comprising one person or a group of persons who are not in marital or family relationship.
4. The institution – a household consisting of persons whose shelter and living needs are satisfied by an institution.

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<sup>35</sup> However, in few villages, the rule did not apply because large majorities of residents were widows. This is the reason why in the respondents distribution we do have slightly more female than male rather than 50% male and 50% female.

<sup>36</sup> Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, J.H.P. and Warner, U., 2009. “Private Household Concepts and their Operationalisation in Cross-National Social Surveys” *Metodološki zvezki*, 6(1), pp. 1-26.

<sup>37</sup> The Steadman Group of Companies, 2007. “WVS Rwanda 2007: Field Technical Report”. Available online at: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>

<sup>38</sup> Afrobarometer, [www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.html](http://www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.html),

All of the following circumstances required the interviewer to leave the selected household and continue to the next randomly selected household: (1) no one at home; (2) residents refused to, or were unable to participate in the research; (3) there were no adults, aged 18 or older, present; (4) there was no respondent of the appropriate gender for that household.

However, when practicable, interviewers were permitted to return to the household at a later time if a potential participant was likely to be available. In instances in which the selected respondent was not at home to conduct the interview, supervisors instructed interviewers to conduct two additional recalls at two different times of the day when the respondent was likely to be at home. Should it happen that the selected respondent was not available at all on that day or when respondents were unwilling to participate (though this was seldom the case), interviewers regarded this as a non-response. This methodological approach is consistent by that followed by the Rwandan sample of the World Values Survey in 2007.<sup>39</sup> This approach also did not allow for the substitution of respondents within the same household/dwelling.

#### **5.4. Data Collection and Entry**

A quantitative data collection approach was used, through the carrying out of face-to-face interviews using a structured questionnaire. The questionnaire was translated and administered in Kinyarwanda according to the preference of research participants. The instrument was also pre-tested prior to the commencement of fieldwork. For further details, see questionnaire here attached as Annex 2.

Data collection was carried out by 30 interviewers, recruited and trained by the Consultants. Requisite employment requirements included a minimum of secondary school education and experience in data collection. Training was provided by the Consultants, and focused on the context and aims of the RRB, sampling procedures, content of the survey instrument, interviewing methods, and neutrality, objectivity and research ethics. All data collection was supervised directly by the IRDP. Interviews wore clearly-marked identification confirming their status as independent fieldworkers at all times while engage in data collection. The Consultants also worked to ensure that fieldwork teams were perceived as independent, professional and broadly representative of Rwandan society.

Temporary staff were be recruited to undertake data entry, using a template developed by the Consultants in SPSS format. Consultants took full responsibility for data cleaning.

#### **5.5. Quality control measures**

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<sup>39</sup> The Steadman Group of Companies, 2007. "WVS Rwanda 2007: Field Technical Report". Available online at: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>

Cumulatively, the following activities and measures further enforced the quality and integrity of the data collection process: the use of a participatory approach in developing research instruments; the hosting of a workshop aimed at validating the research instruments; recruitment of experienced and well-educated interviewers; comprehensive training for interviewers; pre-testing of the research instruments; close supervision of all data collection in the field; recruitment of experienced and skilled data entry staff; and close supervision of all data entry. Data analysis and reporting have been carried out jointly by the IRDP and IJR.

## **VI FIELDWORK AND DATA COLLECTION IN PRACTICE**

### **6.1. Implementation Risks and Challenges**

The Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer is the first national survey of its kind to be conducted in Rwanda. As such, several implementation challenges and risks were taken into consideration at the outset of the research.

First, as discussed previously, no national census has been conducted since territorial reforms were recently introduced, and therefore limited baseline population data was available as yet on the district level. For this reason, an equal number of interviews (100) will be conducted across each of the thirty districts, to ensure as wide a geographic distribution of respondents as possible.

Secondly, because the Reconciliation Barometer was the first of its kind to be conducted in Rwanda, there was a distinct risk that fieldworkers may be met with scepticism and distrust by members of the population. However, efforts to mitigate this risk included:

- Recruitment and training of qualified and experienced fieldwork staff;
- Use of easily-identifiable fieldwork badges;
- Close supervision of fieldwork by experienced and professional fieldwork supervisors; and
- Use of interview scripts that comply with international ethical standards, and guaranteeing the confidentiality and anonymity of all respondents.

### **6.2. Experiences in the Field**

Critical to the interpretation of any survey of this nature is the political and socio-economic context within which it has been conducted. While certain public *attitudes* may be informed by experience and tradition over long periods of time, public opinion is far more fluid and open to be influenced by a given social context at a particular moment. Public opinion literature is replete with examples of how political events, economic conditions, or even natural disasters, can sway sentiments within a very short space of time. In the interest of

scientific rigour and the integrity of survey findings, it is therefore also of importance to assess and report on the environment within which it takes place,

This has, for example, been evident in the responses of the South African public to the SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey, where the researchers have noted distinct changes in particular results where fieldwork coincided with national and local election campaigns. Similarly, it was evident in recent years how the sudden decline in global economic fortunes has impacted on South African citizen's evaluation of their own material and physical security.

In the interest of project transparency, this report also contains a frank assessment of the socio-political and economic context within which fieldwork has taken place. This enriches the value of the report, but also will provide important interpretational markers in terms of which this dataset should be compared with datasets that will follow in its wake.

Fieldwork for the RRB began in late June, and was concluded in July, 2010, lasting approximately four weeks in total. A number of contextual considerations based on experiences in the field must be taken into account in the analysis, interpretation and understanding of the results of the RRB.

### **6.3. Political climate and trends**

A significant characteristic feature of the fieldwork is that, data collection happened to start two months prior to presidential elections, held on 9 August.

The political mood around the country was influenced by anticipation of upcoming elections. The process of registering voters was concluding, political parties had already nominated their candidates, and opposition political parties were attempting to register to contest in the presidential race. In the same period, some party leaders were facing presumed criminal charges of "genocide denial" and destabilisation attempts.

In the pre-election environment, fieldworkers perceived some challenges in eliciting forthright responses from research participants, particularly in relation to evaluation of the governance system and related institutions. Despite multiple measures taken to ensure that fieldworkers were perceived to be independent and neutral, this was not always accepted by research participants. On many occasions, citizens were surprised that the interview did not include questions related to the upcoming elections and political party support.

Challenges resulting from the pre-election climate in the country were also marked by reciprocal allegations between the Rwandan government and emerging political opposition parties, as well as with some independent media that the Media High Council ended up

closing because considered to be subversive. It is worth noting that Rwandan citizens follow with interest all those informations especially through spoken national and international media and consequently were aware of the ongoing political climate. Field supervisors managed to always assure local leaders of the constructive objective of the Barometer.

#### **6.4. Contribution of Local Leadership**

Local leadership played an important role in the conduct of the present research. Though well intended, especially to ease interviewers work, leaders' presence on field may have influenced both the data collection process and the research findings.

From the outset of the RRB, the Consultants accepted that fieldwork of this kind could not be conducted in small towns or villages in Rwanda without the consent and cooperation of local leadership. Though authorization to conduct interviews was received at the national level through the Ministry of Local Governance, and this permission was communicated to district mayors, this was not in fact sufficient to begin fieldwork in practice. Local leadership was informed about research conducted for the RRB within respective administrative territories; while in most cases researchers were welcomed, this required advance assurance that more senior administrators had been informed and accepted the presence of fieldwork teams in the area. In some exceptional cases, local leaders demanded that they be allowed to check the content of the questionnaire before allowing interviews to begin.

Both citizens and local leaders are regularly sensitised and exposed to government programming and policies, including through assessments that often result in rewards to the best performers. In addition to this sense of competition, none of the local leaders would like his entity to be seen as niche of bad opinions. It was clear to research teams that this spirit was driving many local leaders. Many local leaders (Akagari, Umudugudu) appeared to anticipate responses that local citizens would give to the RRB and therefore attempted to prepare those living in the sampled Umudugudu, or to secure an active role in determining which households would be visited. As Umudugudu residents themselves, local leaders also had an equal chance of being included in the research sample. Where local leaders were not interviewed, their reactions varied from indifference to anxiety. Field supervisors played important role in insuring these leaders of the objectivity of the study and in seeking leaders' neutrality.

#### **6.5. Citizen Responses to the RRB**

Based on the experiences of administering the RRB in the field, interviewers concluded that citizens were generally reluctant to participate in interviews related to very sensitive topics. Prior to agreeing to participate in the research, many citizens wanted to know whether permission had been received from local leadership for the fieldwork to proceed.

Fieldworkers remarked on a tendency amongst citizens to agree to participate only when assured that local leaders had been informed and granted consent for the research to take place in advance. In some instances, this even required a formal introduction of the interviewers to citizens by local leaders. While such introductions both hastened the pace of fieldwork and reduced numbers of refusals, fieldworkers also remarked that such direct involvement of local leaders in the research process could in some instances have impacted on citizen perceptions of the independence of the research team.

Another significant observation that holds particular relevance to this survey is the fact that respondents were generally hesitant to respond frankly to questions related to ethnicity. Many research participants told fieldworkers that referring to ethnic groups, such as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa, is “currently forbidden” by government. Fieldworkers also detected significant reluctance to respond to questions related to government institutions and public policies, including those of the gacaca courts, the *ig*, and national reconciliation policy and land redistributions. Some research participants were also under the impression that they themselves were being evaluated or tested on their knowledge and compliance with government policies.

## **6.6. Further considerations: qualitative evaluations**

As discussed above, the first round of the RRB was an exploratory baseline study, and research methods were exclusively quantitative: the research instrument consisted only of a structured questionnaire with close-ended questions. Limitations, including resources and time, prevented collection of additional qualitative data, such as comments, testimonies, anecdotes, and explanations from respondents. However, such data could have allowed for a better understanding of the meaning and motives underlying public opinion, perceptions, attitudes and the behaviours of respondents.

## **VII ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

The Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer measures public opinion on a range of issues, and according to six main variables: human security, political culture and governance, cross-cutting relations, historical confrontation, and social cohesion and integration. These indicators are shown in Table 2 below.

The research instrument is comprised of close-ended items, predominantly on five-point scales, which measure the strength of public opinion among respondents. Research results have been analysed nationally, as well as according to a range of demographic variables, including gender, age, education level, social category and level of urbanisation.



**Table 1: Conceptual overview of variables, hypotheses and indicators**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Hypothesis</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
<b>Political Culture</b>	If citizens view political structures, institutions, values and leadership as legitimate and effective, reconciliation is more likely to occur	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Confidence in public institutions;</li> <li>• Trust in leadership,</li> <li>• Respect of rule of law and courts.</li> </ul>
<b>Human Security</b>	If citizens feel secure (materially, physically and culturally), they will be more willing to commit themselves to national reconciliation processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Physical security</li> <li>• Economic security</li> <li>• Equality of treatment/access</li> <li>• General security</li> <li>• Hope for the future</li> <li>• Freedom of expression</li> </ul>
<b>Citizenship and Identity</b>	A shared sense of national identity, inclusive citizenship and increased tolerance will promote the cause of national reconciliation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National identity</li> <li>• Individual identity</li> <li>• Citizenship</li> <li>• Shared cultural values</li> </ul>
<b>Understanding the Past</b>	If Rwandans are able to confront the sources of their historical social divisions, reconciliation is more likely to occur especially between those who found themselves on different sides during the genocide	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Acknowledgement of facts</li> <li>• History teaching</li> </ul>
<b>Transitional Justice</b>	If parties to conflict get proper justice, they are likely to be reconciled	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Truth</li> <li>• Punishment</li> <li>• Compensation</li> <li>• Forgiveness</li> <li>• Individual healing</li> </ul>
<b>Social Cohesion</b>	If trust increases between Rwandan citizens, and particularly those on different side of the genocide, reconciliation is more likely to occur.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social distance</li> <li>• Tolerance</li> <li>• Trust</li> </ul>

## VIII RRB RESULTS: DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES OF RESEARCH SAMPLE

As described in previous sections, fieldwork for the RRB was carried out between June and July of 2010, with face-to-face interviews conducted with approximately three thousand citizens randomly selected from across each of Rwanda's thirty districts (Uturere). Prior to undertaking analysis of research results, it is important to present an overview of the demographic characteristics of the sample overall.

Rwanda is a densely-populated country, with a national population that both predominantly rural and highly youthful. Women make up approximately 51.6% of the national population,<sup>40</sup> and the research sample was weighted on the basis of this information.

### 8.1. Age and gender

As shown in table 2 below, the highest percentages of both male and female respondents were aged 25-34, and the lowest percentage aged 65 or older.

**Table 2: Age and gender of survey respondents (%)**

	Male	Female
18-24	15.5%	14.9%
25-34	34.4%	31.6%
35-44	21.0%	22.8%
45-54	14.7%	15.3%
55-64	8.1%	9.1%
65 and older	6.3%	6.3%
Total	<i>n</i> = 1436	<i>n</i> = 1533

### 8.2. Residence and Employment status

Given Rwanda's very low levels of urbanisation, the large majority of interviews were conducted either in villages or rural areas (90.5%), and only 6.4% in large cities. Correspondingly, when asked about employment status, high percentages of Rwandans described themselves as agricultural workers (75.3%), and only 2.7% employed in the formal sector. The two figures below summarise the data.

<sup>40</sup> See <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.ZS>

Figure 2: Area in which interviews were conducted (%)





Figure 3: Employment status (%)




### 8.3. Education

Most Rwandans responding to the RRB reported relatively low levels of education, with 26.2% indicating that they had received no formal education whatsoever, and 57.6%

completing only primary education. Only 1.5% of respondents had received tertiary education.


**Figure 4: Level of education (%)**



In the past, a number of social divisions were created in Rwandan society, as a result of colonialisation, conflict and political change and migration patterns. Within Rwandan society, these groups exist as a social reality for many citizens, although substantial work has been done to attempt to overcome cleavages within society and foster a sense of shared national unity and identity. Although discussion of these social categories is highly sensitive for some Rwandans, analysis attitudinal and perceptual differences according to social categories can provide important data on the impact of policy and programming on all Rwandans in the country. Within the RRB sample, 16.4% of respondents identified themselves as “genocide survivors”, 19.7% as “new case refugees”, and 26.7% as “*tigistes*” or relatives of genocide perpetrators. A further 32.6% identified themselves as members of another social category, or refused to answer the question.

### 8.4. Social categories

Figure 5: Social categories (%)



## IX RRB RESULTS: POLITICAL CULTURE

The first variable examined through the RRB was that of political culture, based on the hypothesis that if citizens view political structures, institutions, values and leadership as legitimate and effective, reconciliation is more likely to occur.

Open conflict and violence is a sounding sign of public institutions' failure to manage ordinary conflict between communities or community members. Differences and conflicts based on them are natural, it belongs to government institutions to regulate and prevent any sideslipping. In post conflict societies, leaders need to build institutions that ensure stability on the society. As far as no social group think that any government institution is built or operation against the group's interests, then ties between government and social groups will be strong due to high level of trust. To be more trustable, institutions have also to be effective and fair. They may be well designed, built on precious principles; they may not serve to sustainable reconciliation if such valuable principles are not visible in decisions and actions. The likelihood for real reconciliation depends on level of legitimacy, trust and effectiveness citizens perceive in key institutions such as security organs, justice system, parliament as well as the leadership. Non state institutions play important role in both conflict fueling and conflict transformation. Civil society organisations, political parties and religions are spaces that contribute much in shaping people's behaviours vis-a-vis government institutions and leadership. One can choose and change his political party, religion or CSO but the government is one and is there for all citizens. Hence, reconciliation

and national unity are on likely to be sustainable when citizens have confidence and trust in both state and non state institutions.


### **9.1. Trust in institutions**

To begin, the RRB tested citizen confidence and trust in a range of public and governance institutions, including the national parliament, Cabinet and the justice system. This focus on institutions is important, given the need for strong, impartial bodies that could facilitate unity and national reconciliation across all spheres of society. The destruction of many of these institutions and the divisive nature of the conflict made this a formidable task.

Data collected through the RRB indicates moderate to high levels of trust in public institutions overall, as shown in the table below. More than nine out of every ten Rwandans indicated that they had either “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of trust in Cabinet (92.4%), and responses were comparably high for parliament (91%), the justice system (90%), community policing structures (89.8%) and local authorities (84%).

Trust in these public institutions was notably higher than trust in several other non-governmental organisations, including political parties, religious institutions and civil society organisations (CSO’s). Comparable to social survey data collected in other countries, only 16.1% of respondents indicated that they had a “great deal” of trust in political parties, and 9.7% had no trust in political parties at all. Still, close to three-quarters of all Rwandans had either “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of trust in religious institutions, and 64.8% in CSOs.

Figure 6: Trust in public institutions (%)




### 9.2. Confidence in the media

Respondents indicated a higher level of trust in public media as opposed to private media institutions. 85.2% of respondents indicated at least quite a lot of trust in public media institutions, whereas 53.6% of respondents indicated quite a lot of trust in private media institutions. 89.4% indicated that the media has quite a lot to contribute to reconciliation.

As noted above, the appearance of mutual allegations between the Media High Council and some independent media has mounted over the course of this year, culminating recently with the closure of two newspapers. Rwandans participating in the RRB were asked about their levels of confidence in the media, and while many feel that the media has contributed to increasing reconciliation either a great deal (42.1%) or quite a lot (47.3%), trust levels are distinctly higher in the public media than the private. The table below shows that while confidence in the private media is still relatively high at 53.6%, close to a quarter of

respondents over a third of respondents (‘not very much’ and ‘none at all’ combined) have little or no confidence in this branch of the media.

**Figure 7: Confidence in the media (%)**




### 9.3. Trust in leadership

In addition to demonstrating relatively high levels of trust in public institutions, survey respondents have also displayed high levels of trust in the political leadership of the country. Research participants were asked about the degree to which they trust the country’s leaders to do what is in their best interest, and in addition, whether they feel that country’s leaders care about all Rwandans equally. *In response to both items, agreement levels are high.* Cumulatively, more than 90% of Rwandans strongly agreed or agreed that they can trust the country’s leaders to do what is in their best interest. Responses were only slightly lower to the question of whether leaders care about all people in Rwanda equally, with 13.5% disagreeing. Nonetheless, 82% strongly agreed or agreed that the country’s leaders care equally about all Rwandans. (See Table 4)



Figure 8: Trust in leadership (%)



#### 9.4. Citizen participation


In addition to evaluating confidence in both institutions and leadership, the RRB also sought to measure public attitudes related to citizen participation in political and public life, and ability to influence the policy and decision-making processes of government. It follows logically that participation in the official forums and institutions for unity and reconciliation, should be an important indicator of the extent to which citizens have bought into national policies around these issues.

With regard to citizen participation, a clear pattern is discernable in the RRB results: a majority of citizens indicate that they “always” attend community meetings (71.4%), and a high percentage that they would do so under certain circumstances (25.4%). When asked how likely they would be to “get together with others to raise an issue”, responses were somewhat lower, yet remained high: just over half (51.9%) indicated that they would do this “always”, and about one-third (33.6%) under certain circumstances.

However, citizens appeared much more reluctant to engage in actions closely associated with protest or dispute, even where these may be permitted in law. Overall, 41% indicated


they would never sign a petition, 48.6% that they would never join a boycott, and 53.3% that they would never participate in a legal protest.

**Figure 9: Citizen Participation (%)**




Beyond the likelihood of direct participation in this range of events, the RRB sought to assess whether or not Rwandans feel they can actively influence and shape policy and decision-making processes that happen within government and affect the lives of citizens. Here, variation was also evident across citizen responses. About one-third (33.1%) of all respondents disagree that they have “space and opportunities to influence those that make the laws of the country”. A further 34.2% of respondents agreed that they have “very little say in the important decisions” that affect their lives.

Figure 10: Ability to influence laws and public decisions (%)



Variation of responses is also evident according to analysis of male and female participants. It is evident that two-thirds of male and female respondents are in agreement that there is space and opportunities to influence those that make the laws of the country. However, there is a distinct lack of agreement as to whether individuals have very little say in decisions affecting their lives, with only a third of both male and female respondents who are in agreement with the statement.

**Figure 11 – Ability to influence laws and decisions disaggregated by gender (% agreement)**



**9.5. Political culture summary findings**

This section examined political culture as an independent variable with the potential to explain reconciliation occurrence in Rwanda. It is based on the assumption that if citizens view political structures, institutions, values and leadership as legitimate and effective, reconciliation is more likely to occur.

The results suggest a very high level of confidence (90% and above) in national public institutions, especially the Cabinet, the Parliament, the judiciary system and the Community policing. A lower level of confidence in political parties, civil society organisations and in private media was also revealed by the RRB.

Significant percentages (80% and above) of trust in country’s leaders to do what is in the best interest of the citizens and to care about all people equally were suggested by the survey.

Although the RRB reported a significant level (70% and above) of permanent participation in community meeting attendance and in voting, it was also found that a significant proportion of citizens (nearly 50 %) never use other political participation modalities such as joining a boycott, a legal protest and signing a petition.

In the same vein, significant percentages of respondents (33.1%) disagree that they have “space and opportunities to influence those that make the laws of the country”, while a further 34.2% of respondents agreed that they have “very little say in the important decisions” that affect their lives.

All in all, for most indicators used except that on citizen participation, more than 70 % of responses suggest that citizens view political structures, institutions , values and leadership as legitimate and effective. It can therefore be argued that political culture in Rwanda, though not optimal yet, remains in a position to contribute positively to reconciliation process. However, much is still to be done especially in the area of boosting citizen participation in decisionmaking, and confidence in non-government-led frameworks/organisations such as political parties, civil society organisations, religious organisation, and private media.

## **X RRB RESULTS: HUMAN SECURITY**

In conflict time, people are characterised by fear for their lives and their properties. This feeling of insecurity is caused by the “them”, ie the enemy. Human security goes beyond fear for existing properties and embraces hope for better life conditions such as access to employment, access to land, access to housing, health conditions, equality in resources distribution and equality of treatment regarding each form of public rights. Increasing human security increases peace of mind and paves way to sustainable reconciliation and stronger national unity.

A second variable assessed through the RRB was that of human security, with the hypothesis that if citizens feel secure (materially, physically and culturally), they will be more willing to commit themselves to national reconciliation processes. Indicators used in the RRB to test this variable included both physical and economic security, equality of treatment and access, freedom of expression and hope for the future.

The longevity of democratic systems, regardless of what form they take, are largely dependent on the security that they can offer to those that are governed. Such security not only relates to the physical safety of citizens, but importantly also to their economic wellbeing. Freedom from starvation is no less important than the guarantee of physical safety, and a citizenry’s submission to the laws and institutions that govern them will depend on the extent to which they are instrumental in furthering the prospects for shared prosperity in a safe environment. Without such assurances, the liberties and rights that a democratic state offers in theory become meaningless, its legitimacy wanes, and political stability increasingly becomes challenged by those that choose to exploit such weaknesses.

A substantial international body of scholarly work points to the fact that political stability is unsustainable in societies where poverty is entrenched and the prospect for its alleviation is limited. Popular discontent is further exacerbated when such societies are characterised by crude levels of income inequality and inequities in terms of access to state services. In Africa, such inequality has particularly been manifest along ethnic, tribal, and often also regional lines. Whereas high levels of poverty may therefore result in a direct challenge from the poor to state authority, the added dynamic of inequality along social group lines, superimposed upon it, further fractures the social order.

In the decades running up to the 1994 genocide, successive Rwandan governments have had to suppress perennial social challenges to perceived ethnic dominance of material resources. The end result was the self-destruction of a state through the violation of its reason for existence, the provision of human security to its citizens.

A primary challenge to the post-genocide state has therefore been to restore its legitimacy in the eyes of citizens, and it could only do so through the restoration of their sense of physical safety and economic wellbeing. Given the total destruction of the country's social cohesion and an economy that was in ruins, this was always going to be an extremely difficult challenge.

An evaluation of the country's key economic indicators suggest remarkable progress, even when compared to other states in the region that have not been exposed to similar levels of trauma. While the country continues to be classified as a low-income country, the strides that it has made from a low developmental base have been significant. In 2008 its GDP totalled US\$4,46bn, compared to US\$1,7bn in 2000 and US\$754m in 1994 when the genocide occurred.<sup>41</sup> Annual growth continued to climb and peaked at 11,2% in 2008, before it declined to 6% in 2009 in the wake of the global economic downturn.<sup>42</sup> GDP per capita has increased from US\$218 in 2000 to US\$458 in 2008, and life expectancy increased during the same period from 43 to 50 years.<sup>43</sup> These figures point to marked progress towards some of the objectives that the country has set for itself in its Vision 2020,<sup>44</sup> the strategic document that guides its economic growth path to 2020.

Such achievements are commendable, yet it remains significant that levels of poverty have only declined marginally in spite of the robust growth that the country has experienced in recent years. In 2000, 60% of the population could be categorised as poor, while the comparative figure for 2006 was only three percentage points lower at 57%. This does

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<sup>41</sup> World Bank, (2010) **World Bank Data Webpage** [online], Available at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/rwanda>, [Accessed on 15/08/2010]

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.


<sup>44</sup> Republic of Rwanda, (2000) **Rwanda Vision 2020** [online], Available at: [http://www.gesci.org/assets/files/Rwanda\\_Vision\\_2020.pdf](http://www.gesci.org/assets/files/Rwanda_Vision_2020.pdf), [Accessed on 16/08/2010]

suggest that the way in which the economy distributes growth within society may not be as equitable as it should be. This view has been confirmed by a study, titled “Turning Vision 2020 into Reality: From Recovery to Sustainable Human Development”, which finds that the country’s Gini coefficient (the global measure of inequality where a score of 0 represents complete equality and 1 complete inequality) has increased from 0.47 to 0.51 between 2001 and 2006.<sup>45</sup> These statistics suggest that solutions have to be found to avoid them having an impact on Rwanda’s political and social stability.

### 10.1. Physical Security

Public responses to a number of questions, related to the sense of physical safety that Rwandans experience and anticipate in future, suggest that the overwhelming majority of citizens do not perceive or expect any form of threat to their physical safety in the short- to long term.

Figure 12: Physical security (%)



<sup>45</sup> United Nations Development Programme, Rwanda (2007) *Turning Vision 2020 into Reality: From Recovery to Sustainable Human Development*, National Human Development Report of Rwanda 2007, Kigali: UNDP, p.5

The figure above shows that 86% of respondents either agree or strongly agree with the statement that they do not currently fear a threat to their own physical safety or that of their families. Seventy percent either agree or strongly agree with the contention that an armed conflict within Rwanda is unlikely within the next few years, and indeed more than 94% of respondents noted that Rwanda is becoming a safer country to live in. 94.3% of respondents either agreed or disagreed with this statement. Similarly around 79% of respondents noted that they either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that they were happy with their lives at the time that the survey was conducted.

In surveys to come it would be interesting to track responses to the statement relating to the likelihood of a conflict erupting within foreseeable future again in Rwanda. While the vast majority of respondents indicated that they do not regard this as likely, responses to this statement were more dispersed. Close to 13% did regard it as likely (“disagree” and “strongly disagree”), while close to 9% responded that they don’t know. Eight percent did not wage an opinion on this issue. Responses to this statement are therefore not as clear-cut in one direction. Similarly for the statement relating to satisfaction with life, the disagreement categories added up to close to 17%. When viewed together with the responses in the “neither” category, which totalled 4,6%, close to 22% of respondents did not respond as being satisfied with their lives at present.

### 10.2. Economic Security

Overall, it appears as if Rwandans evaluate their levels of economic security and the future prospects thereof quite positively. Most respondents indicated confidence in the prospects of their own security, but also in the commitment of the Rwandan state to disburse its services and resources in an equitable way that benefits all citizens. Responses in the economic security category are, however, not as overwhelmingly optimistic as has been the case with regard to those in the physical security category.

**Table 3: Economic security (%)**

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't Know
In Rwanda, all people have an equal opportunity to make a living	27.8	42.5	3	21.7	3.8	1.1
It is likely that I will lose my house or land in future	7.3	25.2	7.4	40	16.5	3.4
All people benefit equally from government service delivery	21.6	47.3	3.9	19.5	5.3	2.3



NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION

In Rwanda, all people have access to land	16	44.3	5.3	25.3	5.1	4
National resources are equitably distributed in Rwanda	17.9	42.5	5.9	23.6	6.3	3.7
In Rwanda all groups enjoy equal rights	34.4	51.6	2.6	6	2.6	2.6


In the table above, the first, third, fifth and sixth statements deal with questions of equitable distribution of economic resources and rights, with the most notable of these being land. The second and fourth statements deal with questions of access, and here again the focus is on the question of land.

As noted above the response pattern to these statements differ somewhat from that of those that focussed on the issues of human security. While 70% of respondents agreed with the first statement that all Rwandans have an equal opportunity to make a living, just over a quarter of respondents disagreed ('disagree' and 'strongly disagree' combined) with this sentiment. Similarly, 25% felt that not all Rwandans benefited from government service delivery and 30% believed that national resources are not equitably distributed in society. As far as the distribution of rights in society is concerned, the picture looks somewhat different. Eighty six percent ('disagree' and 'strongly disagree' combined) of respondents felt that all Rwandans do indeed have equal access to the rights that are offered in its constitution, while only 9% per cent disagreed that this was the case.

As far as the two statements relating to access is concerned, close to a third of respondents agreed with the second statement in the table, which suggests the possibility that respondents might lose their homes and/or land in future. In response to the fourth statement, 30% disagreed that all Rwandans have access to land.

None of these findings show particular strong correlations with the key demographic variables. Some results may, however, be of interest. Twenty seven percent of all 18-24 year-olds indicated that they do not believe that all people have equal opportunities to make a living. Just over a quarter of this group also felt that Rwandans do not benefit in equal measure from government service delivery. Looking into the future, it would become increasingly important that this sentiment should change amongst young Rwandans.

Figure 13 – Economic security disaggregated by gender (% agreement)



Both male and female respondents appear to be in favour of the country’s progress in terms of economic security. Approximately two-thirds of both male and female respondents believe that all Rwandans have an equal opportunity to make a living, all individuals benefit equally from government service delivery, access to land, national resources and equal rights. Only a third of respondents feel that it is likely that they will lose their houses or land in the future.

These findings above, particularly those relating to land tenure and access, as well as its distribution may be of considerable significance, given the immense importance that agriculture plays in the lives of the majority of Rwandans. While the majority of Rwandans harboured positive sentiments towards each of the statements in figure 13, it would be advisable that future rounds monitor the extent to which negative sentiment fluctuates.

**10.3. Changes in Rwanda since 1994**

Respondents to the RRB were asked about improvements made in the country since 1994, and in comparison with the experience of genocide, it is clear that a majority feel great strides have been made in many respects. Probably the most significant of these improvements has been in the field of education. In this regard 50.1% of Rwandans noted

that the education system has ‘improved a great deal’ and a further 41.4% felt that it has ‘improved’. Perceptions related to improvements were also highly positive in relation to issues of overcoming social divisions in the post-conflict period: 94.0% indicated that relations between different ethnic groups have improved since 1994; 90,6% noted improvements to relations between people of different backgrounds; 88,5% felt that the situation of returnees improved; and 84,5% indicated that their hope for the future increased. (See the table below)

Notably, however, the level of positive evaluation for economic change is somewhat lower. Overall, 15.4% of respondents indicated that their personal economic situation has in fact worsened over the past sixteen years since the genocide. A further 21.5% felt that access to employment opportunities has worsened, and a further 28.2% responded in this way with regard to the gap between rich and poor. Access to both land and housing seemed to be of concern for Rwandans, with 41.5% and 39.7% respectively indicating that these had worsened.

**Table 4: Changes in Rwanda since 1994 (%)**

	Improved a great deal	Improved	Stayed the same	Worsened	Worsened a great deal	Don't Know
Personal economic situation	19.0	57.6	7.3	13.0	2.4	0.5
Relations between different ethnic groups	27.6	66.4	2.3	2.8	0.3	0.5
Family well-being	17.0	63.5	6.4	10.4	2.2	0.4
Relations between people from different regional origins	25.9	64.7	3.5	3.1	0.6	2.2
Employment opportunities	14.6	47.1	8.3	17.2	4.3	8.3
Access to education	50.1	41.4	1.6	4.7	1	1.2
Hope for the future	28.5	56	3.6	6.7	1.8	3.3
Access to land	9.8	35.9	8.9	31.2	10.3	3.8
Access to housing	10.8	39.3	7.1	28.9	10.8	3
Security of national borders	28.7	52.3	2.4	2.9	0.7	12.8
Situation of returnees in country	30.6	57.9	3	2.6	0.7	5
Gap between rich and poor	11.2	43.4	13.6	19.7	8.5	3.4

#### **10.4. Direction of the Country Overall**

The results of the RRB also indicate an overwhelming level of approval for the overall direction of the country. Of the total sample, 95.2% indicated that national reconciliation in Rwanda was going in the right direction. A further 91.7% of respondents also indicated that democratic governance was going in the right direction.

Figure 14: Direction of the country overall (%)





Figure 15- Direction of the country overall disaggregated by gender (% agreement)



The majority of respondents, both male and female, believe that the country is going in the right direction, in terms of both national reconciliation and democratic governance in Rwanda.

### 10.5. Human Security Summary Findings

The results cited in the preceding two sections suggest that Rwandans, by and large, experience a significant degree of physical security. Large majorities have also indicated that they do not foresee significant changes in future as far as this state of affairs is concerned.

Such security, it can be argued, is however largely dependent on the degree of material security that citizens experience. In this regard the majority of respondents have also expressed positive sentiments towards the prospects for their personal economic circumstances, as well as the commitment of the state to support human development in an equitable and fair fashion. It has nevertheless been apparent that respondents have more reservations about matters relating to economic security than is the case for physical security. In some instances more than a quarter of respondents felt that more could be done to improve matters in this regard.

Since the responses to these statements all represent baseline measurements, it is difficult to assess at this stage whether they represent improvement or decline. Further

measurement and analysis, especially as far as socio-economic security is concerned, will therefore be critical in future surveys.

## **XI RRB RESULTS: CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY**

Coming from any part of the country, speaking a given language, belonging to a certain ethnic group, etc. does not make someone to be less citizen than any other who belong to a different ethnic group, speaks a different language, or comes from a different part of the country, of opposed sex, etc. Every individual is a set of identity elements that are not conflicting as far as only one person is concerned, problem raise when interests of people from “opposing” identity elements clash. Rebuilding an identity based post conflict society bring leaders to decide on how to manage differences, on whether focus on overlapping identity or individual ones. As would ask Engin F.ISIN & Patricia K. WOOD, “What happens when we take the ethos of pluralisation seriously in specific fields of politics today against a fear of fragmentation?”<sup>46</sup>. Dispite sceptical positions of these authors who speak of “false hope for a promised land where citizenship and identity are forever reconciled”, choosing to strengthen shared identity shoul not equal negation of individual identity. Path to national unity implies a society where no one feels more national than others, where citizens feel proudness of bearing shared national identity, where shared values are empowerd and, at the same time, individual identity recognized.

A third variable tested by the RRB was in relation to citizenship and identity among Rwandans, with the hypothesis that a shared sense of national identity, inclusive citizenship and increased tolerance will promote the cause of national reconciliation. Indicators used in relation to this variable included national and individual identity, attitudes regarding citizenship, and the prevalence of shared cultural values.

### **11.1. National Identity**

Since the end of the genocide, the Rwandan government has worked to build and strengthen a shared national identity, specifically through the NURC as well as other governance institutions.

A large majority of RRB respondents (72.1%) strongly agreed that they are proud to be citizens of Rwanda – cumulatively, “strongly agree” and “agree” responses to this question were close to 100%. A further 46.2% of respondents strongly agreed that all citizens share common values. When asked about whether some see themselves as “more Rwandan” that

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<sup>46</sup> Engin F.ISIN & Patricia K. WOOD ,*in* Citizenship and Identity, ( SAGE Publications Ltd, 6 Bonhill street, London)

others, disagreement with this statement reached 71.1%, though about one-fifth did agree that some citizens do see themselves as “more Rwandan than others”.

The RRB also tested the extent to which Rwandans believe reconciliation has been embraced as a national value and practice by citizens. More than 90% agreed that “common national values leading to reconciliation are being promoted in Rwanda today,” and 97.4% agreed that “most Rwandans believe that reconciliation is an important priority”. A further 96.4% agreed that the everyday actions and behaviour of most Rwandans promote reconciliation. (See table below)

**Table 5: National identity and contributions to reconciliation (%)**


	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree
I am proud to be a citizen of Rwanda	72.1	25.8	1.4	0.4	0.1
In Rwanda, all citizens share common values	46.2	47.5	1.8	2.1	0.7
There are some Rwandans who see themselves as more Rwandan than others	7.0	14.4	3.0	42.6	28.5
Common national values leading to reconciliation are being promoted in Rwanda today	43.0	51.5	1.4	1.4	0.5
Most Rwandans believe that reconciliation is an important priority	46.6	50.8	1.2	0.8	0.2
In everyday life, the actions and behaviour of most Rwandans promote reconciliation	44.2	52.2	1.9	0.9	0.2

### **11.2. Individual identity**

The RRB also sought to assess how Rwandans identify themselves individually, in the context of significant efforts to overcome past divisions in the country (see table below).

A large majority of respondents (70.8%) strongly agreed when asked whether they would want their children to think of themselves as Rwandans, over and above any other social identity. A slightly lesser majority (63.6%) strongly agreed that it is more important to identify oneself as Rwandan than any other form of identity. As discussed in relation to experiences in the field, many research participants indicated that they believed that references to ethnicity or ethnic groups are prohibited in Rwanda.


Figure 16a: Individual identity (%)



Barometer respondents were also asked about the social groups with which they identify most strongly (see table below), with interesting results. Across a range of response options, Rwandans were most likely to associate themselves closely with either others who shared their religious beliefs (16.6%) or those with similar values (16.6%). A further 12% identified most closely with others from the same geographic region. When asked about secondary identity, responses were relatively similar, though larger percentages indicated a close association with others of the same age (11.9%) or gender (10.2%).



Figure 16b: Individual identity (%)



### 11.3. Summary findings on citizenship and identity

In this section, the analysis focuses on citizenship and identity among Rwandans, with the hypothesis that a shared sense of national identity, inclusive citizenship and increased tolerance will promote the cause of national reconciliation. In this regard, national and individual identity, attitudes regarding citizenship, and the prevalence of shared cultural values are the indicators used.

The RRB survey came up with very high percentages of Rwandans (more than 90%) who feel proud to be citizens of Rwanda, and who believe that in Rwanda, all citizens share common values.

The feeling that common national values leading to reconciliation are being promoted in Rwanda today is also very significant (94%). The results suggest also a slightly bigger percentage of Rwandans (96%) with the view that in everyday life, the actions and behaviour of most Rwandans promote reconciliation.

As far as individual identity is concerned, more than 9 in 10 Rwandan citizens (98%) want their children to think of themselves as Rwandan rather than hutu, tutsi or twa. In the same

vein, almost the same proportion believes that it is more important to identify oneself as Rwandan than any other identity.

Surprisingly and unlike the common belief, the RRB results suggest that Rwandans are more likely to associate themselves closely with others who shared their religious beliefs (16.6%) or those with similar values (16.6%) rather than those who belong to their ethnic group (6%).

Obviously, the survey indicates that the Rwandan identity remains the primary identity for almost all Rwandan citizens. Given that large majority of Rwandans believe that reconciliation is a key national priority and that national values leading to reconciliation are being promoted, the likelihood that citizenship and identity contributes to bringing about reconciliation in Rwanda remains very high.

## **XII UNDERSTANDING THE PAST**

A fourth variable, which the RRB examined, related to an understanding of the past, with the hypothesis that if Rwandans are able to confront the sources of historical social divisions, reconciliation is more likely to occur, particularly between those who found themselves on opposing sides during the genocide. The project identified the degree to which a shared understanding of the country's history exists as a critical indicator of the extent to which the country is coming to terms with its past. To this end the project presented respondents with a number of statements that attempts to measure the question from various perspectives.

### ***12.1. Acknowledgements of facts and history teaching***

The tables below present the levels of agreement with each of these statements in terms of the total national sample, but also in disaggregated form to account for responses from different age groups.

**Table 6: Understanding the past disaggregated by age category (% Agreement)**

AGREEMENT	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 +	Total
Many of Rwanda's conflicts can be blamed on ethnic manipulation.	64.7	68.4	67.7	69.8	65.5	71.1	69.7
Major issues related to conflict between Rwandans have been frankly discussed and understood.	86.9	87.6	87.3	83.3	87.5	91.4	87.0
Before the genocide, the way history was taught and understood in Rwanda created divisions in society.	89.4	95.3	95.6	94.2	95.7	94.1	97.9
Conflict between the elite within the political sphere have been effectively managed.	62.0	60.8	58.0	55.1	56.7	63.1	59.3
Today, teaching and understanding of true Rwandan history encourages reconciliation.	95.8	95.8	94.3	92.6	93.7	94.7	94.7
Although it is against the law, some Rwandans would try to commit genocide again, if conditions were favourable.	41.9	44.2	39.1	38.7	32.0	29.4	39.9
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	450	979	652	446	255	187	2970

The results show that an overwhelming majority of respondents (97.9%) do feel that the way in which history was conveyed from one generation to another has contributed to major divisions in society, and as a result 94.7% indicated that they felt that the current approach to its teaching is far more conducive to the promotion of reconciliation. A considerable majority (87.0%) also agreed that in the sixteen years following the genocide most of the major issues related to its causes and consequences have been frankly discussed and understood. A somewhat lower level of agreement (59.3%) was registered for the statement, which proposed that conflicts between members of the political elite has been effectively managed. Agreement levels for those that agreed with the suggestion that “many of Rwanda's conflicts can be blamed on ethnic manipulation” (69.7%), are also less emphatic than those for most of the other statements. A result, which may be of concern and should be taken note of, is the fact that 39.9% of respondents agreed that “although it is against the law, some Rwandans would try to commit genocide again, if conditions were favourable”. This does raise questions about respondents’ sense of human security and may need further probing.

In relation to this particular question, it was important to examine potential differences in terms of age categories, particularly given the recent changes in the way Rwandan history is

taught to a new generation in schools and through public awareness campaigns. The results show few generational differences between the first five age categories. The eldest category, those older than 65, is however distinct in that the level of agreement at 29,4% is about 10% below that of the average level of agreement.

**Table 73: Understanding the past disaggregated by social categories (% Agreement)**

	Genocide survivor	Tigistes/ Relatives of perpetrators	Old case refugees*	New case refugees	Historically marginalised*	Other/ refused
Many of Rwanda's conflicts can be blamed on ethnic manipulation.	73.3	73.8	70.2	62.2	74.2	63.3
Major issues related to conflict between Rwandans have been frankly discussed and understood.	84.8	84.4	87.2	91.1	93.5	87.5
Before the genocide, the way history was taught and understood in Rwanda created divisions in society.	94.9	94.6	95.7	94.2	96.8	93.5
Conflict between the elite within the political sphere have been effectively managed.	57.0	54.9	61.7	62.7	61.3	62.0
Today, teaching and understanding of true Rwandan history encourages reconciliation.	95.3	93.7	91.5	95.6	93.5	95.1
Although it is against the law, some Rwandans would try to commit genocide again, if conditions were favourable.	52.0	35.3	63.8	39.0	41.9	35.7
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	486	792	94	586	31	969
*While responses to certain social categories have been included, small numbers of self-identified respondents within those categories prevent meaningful statistical analysis.						

Given the country's historical social fragmentation and its further entrenchment by the 1994 genocide, it would also be of significance to investigate the degree to which there may be variance in responses of the country's different social sectors. From the results that have been presented in the table above, it is apparent that there have been relatively little differences in the responses of the respective categories to each of the statements. The one important exception, however, lies with opinions regarding the final statement that there

are elements in the Rwandan society that would perpetrate acts of genocide if given the opportunity. While the national average for agreement on this question stands at 39,9%, the figure for the 'genocide survivors' and 'old case refugees' stood at 52% and 63,8% respectively. This must be contrasted with the 35,3% of '*tigistes*/relatives of perpetrators' category. Yet, given the history related to the latter category, it is significant that also here we find more than a third of respondents in agreement.

### **12.2. Summary findings on understanding the past**

In this section, the degree to which a shared understanding of the country's history exists as a critical indicator of the extent to which the country is coming to terms with its past was examined. The underlying assumption was that if Rwandans are able to confront the sources of historical social divisions, reconciliation is more likely to occur, particularly between those who found themselves on opposing sides during the genocide.

The results suggest very high percentages of Rwandans with the view that before the genocide, the way history was taught and understood in Rwanda created divisions in society (98%), and that today, teaching and understanding of true Rwandan history encourages reconciliation (94.7%). Moreover, there are significant percentages of respondents with the view that major issues related to conflict between Rwandans have been frankly discussed and understood (87%), and that many of Rwanda's conflicts can be blamed on ethnic manipulation (69.7%).

The survey also came up with a significant belief that although it is against the law, some Rwandans would try to commit genocide again, if conditions were favourable (almost 40 %). Surprisingly, such a belief remains higher in younger people (aged 18-34) than among older people, and among genocide survivors and old case refugees than among relatives of genocide perpetrators, *tigistes* and new case refugees.

Based on the above results, it is obvious that large majority Rwandans share the view that history teaching and ethnic manipulation have significantly shaped the division among Rwandans. This common understanding of some aspects of the past, we can argue, is a good sign that the likelihood that Rwandan citizens can reconcile is high. However, the persisting fear- among some Rwandans, mainly genocide survivors, old case refugees, and young people - of a genocide reoccurrence might hinder the reconciliation process, if concrete measures are not taken.

## **XIII TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE**

In the aftermath of the genocide a profound need existed for justice towards its victims. Without it the rebuilding of this society that had been torn apart by violence would have been inconceivable. The collapse of the judicial system had been one of the major casualties of this period, and in the light of a system that was not equipped with such massive challenges, the need existed to deal with the issue of genocide justice through alternative transitional structures. The domestic response primarily came through the use of the Gacaca courts, as a restorative justice measure to deal with perpetrators on a communal level. On the international front, the United Nations instituted the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to focus on perpetrators that were no longer resident in Rwanda.

The fifth variable examined through the RRB was that of transitional justice, based on the hypothesis that if parties to conflict get proper justice, they are likely to be reconciled. Indicators used are individual healing, truth, punishment, compensation and forgiveness. The results are presented in different tables and figures below.

### 13.1. Individual Healing

The questions in the table below provide an overview of how Rwandans think about a number of a key questions relating to justice and reconciliation, as far as individual healing is concerned.

**Table 8: Individual healing (%)**


	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't Know
I have forgiven those who hurt others in the past.	36.5	53.4	6.5	2.2	.7	.6
Many genocide perpetrators have shown remorse for their crimes.	21.6	61.2	5.9	6.9	1.6	2.8
Those who did wrong in the past have sought forgiveness.	23.0	57.4	8.8	7.5	1.8	1.3
The attitude of some Rwandans suggests that they still want to take revenge for the events of the past.	5.8	20.1	5.8	37.6	23.5	6.9
I feel that I have healed from the wounds of the past.	23.0	55.5	8.2	8.9	2.7	1.5
I have no choice but to reconcile with others in my community, or face the consequences	11.3	23.2	6.8	35.6	20.9	2.0

I personally have experienced reconciliation in my own life.	34.3	51.1	7.3	3.2	2.2	1.5
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The responses to these questions suggest that Rwandans are willing to forgive crimes that were perpetrated against them or their families; that they largely perceive perpetrators to be remorseful; and that they are willing to commit themselves to a national reconciliation project. If one combines the 'agree' and 'strongly agree' responses for the statement that the respondent has forgiven those that have hurt others during the past, it is apparent that close to 90% agreed that this has indeed been the case; 82,9% felt that genocide perpetrators have demonstrated sufficient remorse; and 80,4% of Rwandans were convinced that most wrongdoers have sought forgiveness since the genocide. Just over a quarter of respondents (25,9%) do, however, believe that revenge by some in society still remains a possibility, while 61,1% disagreed with this notion.

The same table shows that 78,5% of respondents experienced personal healing in response to the statement: "I feel that I have healed from the wounds of the past", and a further 85,4% indicated that they have personally experienced reconciliation. In response to the statement that suggests that respondents have reconciled with others because they don't have any other option, 34,5% agreed, while 55,6% disagreed.

**Figure 17 – Individual healing disaggregated by gender (% agreement)**



The majority of male and female respondents indicate a willingness to forgive perpetrators of the genocide (89.3% of males and 90.3% of females). 83.2% of males and 82.4% of females believe that many genocide perpetrators have shown remorse for their crimes and 79.9% of males and 81% of females believe that those who did wrong in the past have sought forgiveness. A small percentage of males (26.6%) and females (25.4%) agree that the attitude of some Rwandans suggest that they still want to take revenge for the events of the past. 79.6% of males and 77.5% of females agree that they have healed from the wounds of the past. A small percentage of male and female respondents agree that they have no choice but to reconcile with others in their communities (33% of males and 35.7% of females). A larger percentage of Rwandans agree that they have personally experienced reconciliation in their own lives (85.3% of males and 85.4% of females).

**13.2. Parties to reconciliation**

For reconciliation to take root in a society, some form of consensus need to exist around who the primary parties to such a process should be. The survey has attempted to ascertain which groups ordinary Rwandans think are critical to the national reconciliation process. The tables below contain a number of options, with which respondents were presented, as well



as the results that this measurement instrument has rendered. Participants were asked to suggest a primary and secondary combination of parties that need to be reconciled.

**Table 9: Parties to reconciliation**

	Primary response		Secondary response	
	%	N	%	N
Rwandans and other Rwandans	33.2	983	25.9	759
Genocide perpetrators and genocide survivors	48.4	1434	15.9	466
Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups	15.0	443	20.2	594
Civil society organisations and citizens	.9	27	1.5	45
Old case refugees and other Rwandans	.7	21	1.8	53
Citizens and leaders	.3	9	2.0	60
Leaders between themselves	.4	13	3.2	95
Rwandan government and the international community	.2	5	4.5	131
Other	.1	4	6.1	178
Refused	.2	7	2.4	71
Don't know	.5	15	16.4	482
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2961</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2935</b>

In response to the request to identify the primary parties to national reconciliation, the first option for 48,4% or was “Genocide Perpetrators and Survivors” with 48,4%, followed by “Rwandans and other Rwandans” with 33,2%, and then “Hutu and Tutsi Ethnic Groups” with 15.0%. Responses to the remainder of categories are insignificant, given response percentages of less than 1%. In terms of the next table, which reflects on the second most important combination of parties to national reconciliation, “Rwandans and other Rwandans” (25,9%) was the most selected option, followed by “Hutu and Tutsi Ethnic Groups” (20,2%), and surprisingly the third most selected option has been the “Don’t Know” option with 16,4%. Following shortly behind this category has been the “Genocide Perpetrators and Survivors” category with 15,9%. Further investigation would probably be required to ascertain why the “Don’t know” option could elicit more responses than a far more obvious category such as the latter.

### **13.3. Transitional Justice in Rwanda**

After a violent and divisive conflict, such as that of Rwanda, it is very likely that perceptions of justice will vary according to the side of the conflict that an individual found him or herself on. It therefore follows that the creation of a justice system, which enjoys

confidence and legitimacy from all opposing parties, would be a massive challenge for the transition from violence to sustainable peace. An important indicator of reconciliation in such contexts is therefore the extent to which people trust the justice system to bring about law and order, regardless of who comes before it. The table below presents a number of statements that gauge Rwandan public opinion in this regard.

**Table 10: Perceptions on Justice delivered**

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
The truth about the genocide in Rwanda, as it really happened, was revealed through Gacaca courts.	49.4	44.3	2.0	2.0	1.0	.2
Inyangamugayo were impartial in the Gacaca process.	35.7	47.7	5.6	8.0	1.4	.1
Those convicted through gacaca received fair punishment	34.1	55.2	3.0	5.4	.9	.1
Those convicted through gacaca have served sentences and been reintegrated into Rwandan society	40.6	54.2	1.8	1.4	1.4	.1
Genocide survivors have been compensated for the crimes committed against them.	19.6	51.2	7.5	12.8	4.1	.0
Genocide will never occur again in Rwanda, because the underlying causes have been dealt with.	35.8	47.2	5.3	3.8	4.2	.1
Survivors of the genocide have received enough support and assistance from government.	18.5	51.0	6.2	11.4	8.8	.1
Those whose properties/assets had been abusively taken from them (1959 and 1994) have recovered them.	28.0	49.3	5.8	10.6	4.5	.0
Land redistribution after 1994 has lowered land-related issues.	16.5	45.4	3.8	5.9	26.4	.1
Land redistribution after 1994 has impacted positively on social cohesion.	17.2	41.8	4.3	7.5	26.6	.1

A cursory view of the results presented above suggests that Rwandans are generally satisfied with the course of justice and the instruments and institutions that have been used to bring this about.

For an overwhelming percentage of Rwandans, 93,7% (agree and strongly agree combined), most of what happened during the genocide has become known through the processes of the Gacaca courts. Since all respondents were older than 18 it is therefore likely that most have attended a Gacaca court at least once. This percentage is significantly high to suggest that all Rwandans social categories hold a majority view that almost all information were revealed throughout Gacaca meetings. This finding may be largely due to the fact that an overwhelming majority (83,4%) of respondents also indicated that they believed in the impartiality of Gacaca Judges.


The objective of Gacaca justice was not a retributive justice, but rather restorative, which implies that its primary purpose was not punishment but rebuilding trust among Rwandans and to facilitate reconciliation. Asked about the fairness of punishment, 89% of Rwandans responded that they felt that the punishment received by perpetrators were fair. The statement relating to compensation shows that 70.8% of respondents felt that genocide survivors were fairly compensated. It is worthy noting that compensation was meant and understood by both researchers and respondents as restitution of material belongings lost following the genocide.

Instead of compensation, in its legal sense, Rwanda post-genocide leadership placed specific emphasis on the provision of support to more vulnerable genocide survivors. A Genocide Survivors' Fund (FARG: Fonds d'Assistance aux rescapés du Génocide) was, for example, instituted for this purpose. Though significant achievements were made, there are also number of shortcomings to this dispensation that have been raised Rwanda. As shown in the statement relating to government support for survivors, 69,5% of respondents indicated that they approved of government efforts in this regard.

Land restitution remains a critical issue in post-genocide Rwanda, given the central role that land has played during the genocide but also the in the decades leading up to it. A sensitive and efficient approach to this question was therefore critical over the past sixteen years. In terms of the public opinion expressed in this survey, the majority of citizens (83%) have expressed approval for the measures thus far to restore ownership to those who were forcefully removed. A lower percentage (62%) has however indicated that restorative measures have reduced the number of disputes related to land, while an even lower percentage (59%) felt that it has contributed to social cohesion.

In terms of the future stability of Rwanda it is important that citizens do not live in fear of the kind of violence that the country has witnessed in 1994. Often the tension associated with such fear can be enough to ignite unnecessary conflict. Most respondents (83%), however, indicated that they believe that the causes of the violence have been sufficiently dealt with to ensure that this would not happen again.

Figure 18: Perceptions on Justice delivered (% agreement)



The data indicates that the majority of both male and female respondents believe that the truth about genocide was revealed through gacaca (94.4% of males and 93.2% of females). 83.5% of males and 83.3% of females believe inyangamugayo were impartial during the gacaca process. 89.2% of males and 89.5% of females believed that those convicted through gacaca received received fair punishment. 95.1% of males and 94.3% of females agreed that those convicted through gacaca have served sentences and have been reintegrated into Rwandan society. 70.1% of males and 71.6% of females agreed that genocide survivors have been compensated for crimes committed against them. 85.6% of males and 80.5% of females agreed that genocide will never occur again in Rwanda, because the underlying causes have been deal with. 68.7% of males and 70.3% of females believe that survivors of the genocide have received enough support and assistance from the government. 78.4% of males and 76.2% of females agree that those whose properties/assets had been taken away from them have recovered them. 63.9% of males and 59.8% of females agreed that land redistribution after 1994 has lowered land-related issues. 60.8% of males and 57.4% of females believe that land redistribution after 1994 has impacted positively on social cohesion.

The figure above presents findings for the entire Rwandan population. For a proper analysis, it would however also be necessary to ascertain whether there are significant differences in the way that historically distinct social groups or sectors respond to these same questions. The table below disaggregates the same results on this basis.

**Table11: Perceptions on Justice to Rwandans disaggregated by their social categories (% Agreement)**

	Genocide survivor	Tigistes/ relatives	Old case refugees *	New case refugees	Historically marginalised*	Other/ refused
Many genocide perpetrators have shown remorse for their crimes.	71.5%	86.1%	68.1%	85.9%	96.8%	85.1%
Those who did wrong in the past have sought forgiveness.	69.1%	84.7%	66.0%	84.8%	83.9%	81.2%
The attitude of some Rwandans suggests that they still want to take revenge for the events of the past.	30.0%	24.9%	29.8%	26.8%	19.4%	24.3%
I have no choice but to reconcile with others in my community, or face the consequences.	42.6%	32.5%	42.6%	31.0%	41.9%	33.3%
Those convicted through gacaca received fair punishment.	80.7%	92.2%	90.4%	92.0%	93.5%	89.5%
Genocide survivors have been compensated for the crimes committed against them.	56.7%	73.7%	66.0%	79.1%	67.7%	71.5%
Survivors of the genocide have received enough support and assistance from government.	61.2%	69.4%	73.1%	77.4%	60.0%	69.1%
Land redistribution after 1994 has lowered land-related issues.	58.6%	54.6%	76.3%	66.2%	61.3%	65.6%
Land redistribution after 1994 has impacted positively on social cohesion.	55.6%	51.9%	73.4%	63.0%	67.7%	62.8%
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	n = 486	n = 792	n = 94	n = 586	n = 31	n = 969
*While responses to certain social categories have been included, small numbers of self-identified respondents within those categories prevent meaningful statistical analysis.						

As became evident in previous tables, most respondents agree about the positive achievements of the transitional justice measures that have been put in place. The table above shows that if broken down in the respective population sectors, genocide survivors, perpetrators relatives, tigistes, historically marginalized people, old and new case refugees and the “others” group display high levels of agreement with the idea that genocide perpetrators have shown remorse. Such agreement is highest amongst historically


marginalised people (96,8%), followed by the combined category of ‘tigistes’ and the relatives of genocide perpetrators at 86,1%. It is worth noting that the more reluctant category seems to be the “old case refugees”, which registered a considerably lower level of agreement at 68,1%.

An interesting aspect of these disaggregated findings has been the fact that responses for genocide survivors have been quite similar to those of “old case refugees.” Similarly, the same is observable for the responses of “perpetrators relatives and tigistes” and “new case refugees” groups.

Levels of agreement are relatively lower when it comes to assertions regarding land redistribution and its impact on the lowering of conflict and the promotion of social cohesion. The table above show that “old case refugees” display high levels of agreement with the relevant statements, as opposed the slightly lower affirmative responses by the “perpetrators relatives and tigistes” category. On the final two statements, responses from “genocide survivors” and “perpetrators relatives and tigistes” appear to be quite close to each other. In this regard it is worth remembering that most “old case refugees” do not live in their “traditional lands”, largely because they were not able to reoccupy them when they returned back to Rwanda after 35 years in exile. Many have settled on new sites, which have been allocated by the government, while others have bought properties through their own means.

All statements up to this point have dealt with domestic responses to justice in Rwanda. In the table below we present responses to the effectiveness of an external instrument of justice, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)

Figure 19: Level of agreement over ICTR performance



While most Rwandans are aware of the purpose and nature of the ICTR, it is quite notable that close to a quarter of citizens are not able to wage an opinion on its effectiveness. While about 59% of respondents felt that it was effective ('very effective' and 'effective' combined), only about 13% regarded it as ineffective.

**13.4. Summary findings on transitional justice**

This section looked at transitional justice as a critical ingredient of reconciliation, with the hypothesis that if parties to conflict get proper justice, they are likely to be reconciled. The RRB results suggested very high percentages (more than 80%) signs of individual healing based on occurrence of forgiveness seeking and giving, healing from the wounds of the past and experience of reconciliation in one's life.

However, the survey came up with significant percentages of Rwandans (34.5%) who feel that engaging in reconciliation process is not a voluntary commitment, and that the attitude of some Rwandans suggests that they still want to take revenge for the events of the past (almost 26%).

As far as parties to reconciliation is concerned, respondents mentioned primarily and in order of importance genocide survivors and genocide perpetrators (48.4%); Rwandans and other Rwandans (33.2%); as well as Hutu and Tutsi (15%).

The RRB also suggested a very high confidence in Gacaca as a transitional justice mechanism. More than eighty percent of respondents appreciate positively the

achievements of Gacaca in terms of truth unveiling, punishment, impartiality of judges, etc. However, the survey showed less appreciation vis-a-vis the compensation for the genocide survivors. Lesser appreciation was also recorded as far as ICTR is concerned.


Globally speaking, for the majority of indicators used, more than 70 % of responses suggest high satisfaction with the justice that they received. This percentage is high enough to argue that transitional justice in Rwanda is in a better position to enhance reconciliation as suggested by the working hypothesis.

#### XIV SOCIAL COHESION

A descriptive analysis of the RBB data points to significant progress in terms of forging social cohesion in the wake of the genocide in 1994. It suggests a positive shift in inter-ethnic relations and interactions, and a considerable degree of willingness to engage in interactions with people from different ethnic groups. It appears, according to the data, as if this predisposition stems from an increase in trust of people from these different groups. The RBB also indicates that, contrary to popular belief, it is not ethnic-, but rather economic cleavages that are most divisive in Rwandan society today. Thirty percent of adult Rwandans responded that the gap between rich and poor is the primary source of division in society,

##### 14.1. Personal experience of ethnic discrimination

Figure 20: Experience of ethnic discrimination



The data suggests a low level of ethnic based-prejudice, discrimination and stereotyping among adult Rwandans. Most (about 93%) indicated that they have never experienced



ethnic prejudice since the end of the genocide, while only 6% reported that they have fallen victim to prejudice of this nature. However, the data indicates that an important percentage of Rwandans (31.5%) think that ethnic discrimination is still practiced in Rwanda, even though it is legally banned. Sixty percent of respondents indicated that ethnic discrimination does not occur in Rwanda anymore and, in the same vein, 62% of Rwandans believe that citizens do not judge each other on the basis of ethnic stereotypes any more. The results however show that 30.5% perceive such judgements still to take place.


**Table 12: Experiences of ethnic discrimination by social group (% Agreement)**

	Genocide Survivor	Relative of Perpetrator	Tigiste	Old case refugee	New case refugee	Hist. marginalised People	Refused	Other
I have never experienced ethnic prejudice in Rwanda since the end of the genocide	87.9	93.0	97.1	87.2	94.2	96.8	95.9	94.8
Although ethnic discrimination is banned in Rwanda, it still occurs	44.1	30.3	18.2	52.1	31.2	41.9	42.6	32.2
Rwandans still judge each other on the basis of ethnic stereotypes	39.1	28.3	18.2	43.6	28.0	32.3	35.2	27.7
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	486	757	34	94	585	31	122	845
*While responses to certain social categories have been included, small numbers of self-identified respondents within those categories prevent meaningful statistical analysis.								

The table above presents levels of agreement (those who either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’) with a number of statements measuring perceptions of ethnic prejudice since the end of the genocide. These have been disaggregated in terms of the different population sectors between which the survey distinguishes. Twenty seven percent of those that do not regard themselves as falling in any of these categories agreed with the statement that they have never experienced ethnic prejudice in Rwanda, while 23.8% of genocide perpetrators/suspects, 18.6% of new case refugees, 14,5% of genocide survivors, and 2,8% of old case refugees responded in the affirmative to the statement. The results show that the perception among genocide survivors (7.3%) is slightly higher than among genocide perpetrators (6.7%). The same perception is, of course, also visible among those who do not find themselves in any of the suggested social categories (9.2%) and among new case refugees (6.2%). The data indicates that, as far as the perception that Rwandans still judge each other on the basis of ethnic stereotypes is concerned, the perception is higher among

those who do not find themselves in any of the suggested social categories (8.0%) and among relatives of genocide perpetrators/suspects than among other suggested social categories.

**Figure 21: Experience of ethnic discrimination, disaggregated by age group (% agreement)**




This figure above presents responses to the same three questions, but disaggregated in terms of different age categories. It points to only slight difference in the way that different generations of Rwandans experience ethnic prejudice. Although at least more than 91% in all age groups have never experienced it since the end of the genocide, the absence of such experiences increases from younger to older age categories.

Differences between age groups in responses to whether ethnic discrimination still takes place are also marginal. Just over 38% of young people (age group 18-24) thought this to be the case, compared to 29.1% of those aged 55-64, and 28.5% of those aged 65 and older. This situation is nearly the same as far as responses to ethnic stereotyping is concerned. Amongst those who are aged 18-24, 36.8% felt that this is the case, 23.9% of those aged 55-64 perceived it to be true, as did and 25.1% of those aged 65 and older.

**14.2. Trust between those on different sides of the Rwandan conflict and genocide**

**Figure 22: Trust between those on different sides of the Rwandan conflict and genocide (% agreement)**



The figure above presents findings on perceptions relating to trust amongst those who found themselves on different sides of the genocide. The results point to substantial levels of trust between the different groups. More than 92% of adult Rwandans believe that relations have improved between groups that found themselves in opposing camps during the genocide. Almost 7 out of 10 respondents disagreed with the statement that they or their families found it difficult to trust Rwandans who were at the other end of the conflict. It is, however, notable that almost 1 in 4 adult Rwandans (24.7%) agree with this sentiment. As far as the impact of the past on current social relationships is concerned, the data suggests that 78% of adult Rwandans disagree with the opinion that Rwanda's past still divides its people, 16 years after the genocide.

**Table 134: Trust between those on different sides of the Rwandan conflict and genocide by social category (%)**


AGREEMENT	Genocide Survivor	Relative of Perpetrator	Tigiste	Old case refugee	New case refugee	Historically marginalised People	Refused	Other
Since 1994, relations have improved between those who found themselves on different sides of the genocide	89.3%	92.3%	97.1%	92.6%	94.2%	87.1%	92.6%	93.0%
It is difficult for me or my family to trust Rwandans who found themselves on the other side of the conflict during the genocide.	37.7%	19.0%	21.2%	34.0%	25.1%	35.5%	24.6%	20.7%
Rwanda's past still divides its people today.	20.8%	14.9%	18.2%	23.4%	15.7%	16.1%	5.7%	22.2%
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	486	757	34	94	585	31	122	845
*While responses to certain social categories have been included, small numbers of self-identified respondents within those categories prevent meaningful statistical analysis.								

The data presented in the table above looks at the same statements, but through the prism of the respective population sectors. As far as the statement regarding the improvement of social relations since 1994 is concerned, all respondent categories have registered very high levels agreement, with the lowest of these being the 'Historically Marginalised' category with 87%. Agreement levels with the following statement on the difficulty that respondents may have to trust those that found themselves on the other side of the genocide divide, are considerably lower, albeit somewhat more disparate. The highest level of agreement came from 'genocide survivors' at 37,7%, which is 17 percentage points higher than the national average. On the other side, the lowest level of agreement has been 19.0% amongst 'relatives of perpetrators.' Affirmative responses to the statement that Rwanda's past still divides its population is equally low and disparate. 'Old Case Refugees', with 23,4%

registered the highest level of agreement, while those who refused to categorise themselves were the least likely to agree with the statement at 5,7%.


### 14.3. Spontaneous inter-ethnic interactions after 1994

Figure 22: Spontaneous inter-ethnic interactions after 1994 (%)



The figure above presents data that reports on respondents' interaction with people from ethnic groups other than their own. It is worth bearing in mind that though there is no statistic on inter-ethnic interactions right after the genocide. The highest agreement level (83,3%) has been for instances related to material or financial assistance for somebody from another ethnic group, while the lowest frequency recorded was for the receiving of financial or material support from somebody from another ethnic group.

Figure 23: Spontaneous inter-ethnic interactions after 1994 disaggregated by gender(% agreement)



Opinions on spontaneous inter-ethnic interactions after 1994 show that 73% of males and 75.4% of females often assist those from other ethnic groups, both materially and financially. 70.8% of males and 72.8% of females often receive financial assistance/material support from those from another ethnic group. 79.9% of males and 81.7% of females indicate that they will often borrow a tool or use a service from someone from a different ethnic group in their communities. 81% of males and 82.8% of females will often lend a tool or give a service to someone from a different ethnic group in their communities.


**Table 14: Spontaneous inter-ethnic contact by social category (% often/always)**

Often/Always	Genocide Survivor	Relative of Perpetrator	Tigiste	Old case refugee	New case refugee	Hist. marginalised people	Refused	Other
Assist someone from another ethnic group materially or financially	76.5	77.4	66.7	81.9	70.8	64.5	68.9	73.6
Receive financial assistance/material support from someone from another ethnic group	73.5	76.8	75.8	76.6	69.6	54.8	62.3	69.7
Borrow a tool or use a service from someone from a different ethnic group in your community	84.8	83.9	91.2	90.4	76.3	74.2	77.9	78.4
Lend a tool or give a service to someone from a different ethnic group in your community	85.2	85.1	91.2	93.5	77.8	77.4	77.9	80.0
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	486	757	34	94	585	31	122	845
*While responses to certain social categories have been included, small numbers of self-identified respondents within those categories prevent meaningful statistical analysis.								

The table above presents findings for the same statements as those in the previous table, but is disaggregated in terms of responses by the country's different social groups. It, furthermore, only reports on the levels of agreement ("always" or "often"), within each. The overall picture, presented by the data, is one where a generally high level of receptiveness exists for various forms of inter-group contact. The majority of responses register an approval of over 70 percent, with only one being lower than 60%. Generally respondents in each of these groups appeared to be more reticent to give or receive material or financial assistance from other groups. In contrast, the last two categories relating to the borrowing or lending of a tool from somebody from a different group, received higher approval ratings. Since all these percentage are high, it must, however, be emphasised once again that these difference are very relative.

**14.4. Being Comfortable with inter-ethnic contact**


**Figure 24: Comfortable with inter-ethnic contact (%)**



Sixteen years after the genocide mistrust and fear between members of different ethnic groups seem to have dissipated significantly, as suggested by the data in the above figure. More than 90% of respondents felt comfortable to engage with other groups in acts, which were incomprehensible in the immediate wake of the genocide. Such behaviour include: asking favours from somebody from another ethnic group; having an intimate friend from such a group; joining an association/cooperative of which the majority of members are from another group; joining a political party whose supporters are mostly from another group; or joining a church where the respondent’s ethnic group is in a minority. Responses to all these statements overwhelmingly point towards the willingness of Rwandans to engage with each other across historically-defined ethnic lines.



Figure 25: Comfortable with inter-ethnic contact disaggregated by gender (% comfortable)



93.8% of males and 94.1% of females feel comfortable asking a favour from a neighbor of a different ethnic group. 93.5% of males and 91.6% of females indicated that they feel comfortable having an intimate friend from another ethnic group. 96% of males and 95.4% of females feel comfortable joining an association or cooperative made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group. 91.7% of males and 90.7% of females feel comfortable joining a political party made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group. 96.5% of males and 96.5% of females feel comfortable joining a church congregation made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group.

**Table 15: Comfortable with inter-ethnic contact occurs by age group (% Comfortable)**

<b>Comfortable</b>	<b>18-24</b>	<b>25-34</b>	<b>35-44</b>	<b>45-54</b>	<b>55-64</b>	<b>65 and older</b>
Asking favour from neighbour of different ethnic group	91.8	94.7	94.6	93.7	94.5	93.0
Having an intimate friend from another ethnic group	90.2	93.0	93.5	93.7	91.4	89.8
Joining association/ cooperative made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group.	95.3	95.6	96.9	96.0	94.9	93.6
Joining a political party made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group	91.1	91.4	91.1	92.6	91.0	88.2
Joining a church congregation made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group	96.0	96.9	96.6	97.1	95.7	95.2
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	450	979	652	446	255	187

A breakdown of the same responses in terms of age groups, as has been presented above, shows that Rwandans, irrespective of their age, are comfortable in engaging with other groups in the mentioned contexts. Within the sampled population there therefore seems to be little generational variance in the degree of ease with which respondents interact with other groups.


**14.5. Approval of inter-ethnic interactions**

**Table 16: Approval of inter-ethnic interactions (%)**

	Strongly approve	Approve	Neither	Disapprove	Strongly disapprove
Owning/operating a business with someone from another ethnic group	50.9	45.2	1.5		.4
Working for and taking orders from someone from another ethnic group	50.2	47.9	.6	.5	.1
Voting for someone from another ethnic group	56.2	41.4	1.0	.7	.2
Marrying or having a close relative marry someone from another ethnic group	50.8	43.2	1.8	3.2	.6
Leaving your child, or the child of a family member, in the care of someone from another ethnic group	50.4	46.1	1.0	1.4	.5

The table above presents results to a next series of statements, probing the extent to which respondents were willing to forge relationships with ethnic groups, other than the one that they belong to. The data shows that more than 90% of Rwandans approve of interactions between members of different ethnic groups in all of instances that were measured. Ninety eight percent of respondents indicated that they are willing to work or take orders from someone from another ethnic group; 94% percent approved of marriages across ethnic lines; 96% were open to the idea of owning/operating business with someone from another ethnic group; 98% indicated that they would for someone from another ethnic group; and 97% approved of leaving their child, or the child of a family member, in the care of someone from another ethnic group.

Figure 26: Approval of inter-ethnic interactions disaggregated by gender (% approval)



Almost 96.7% of males and 95.5% of females approve of owning or operating a business with someone from another ethnic group. 98.6% of males and 97.7% of females approve of working for and taking orders from someone from another ethnic group. 97.8% of males and 97.4% of females approve of voting for someone from another ethnic group. 94.6% of males and 93.4% of females approve of marrying or having a close relative marry someone from another ethnic group. 96.8% of males and 96.6% of females approve of leaving their child or a child of a family member in the care of someone from another ethnic group.

**Table 17: Approval of inter-ethnic interactions disaggregated by social category (% approval)**


Approval	Genocide Survivor	Relative of Perpetrator	Tigiste	Old case refugee	New case refugee	Historically marginalised People	Refused	Other
Own/operate business with someone from another ethnic group	93.0	96.0	100.0	98.9	96.9	90.3	95.9	97.4
Working for and taking orders from someone from another ethnic group	96.3	98.8	100.0	98.9	98.5	96.8	99.2	98.5
Voting for someone from another ethnic group	92.2	98.8	100.0	97.9	97.9	96.8	98.4	99.3
Marrying or having a close relative marry someone from another ethnic group	88.7	93.0	100.0	92.6	94.4	93.5	96.7	97.2
Leaving your child, or the child of a family member, in the care of someone from another ethnic group	90.3	97.9	100.0	94.7	97.1	96.8	99.2	98.3
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	486	757	34	94	585	31	122	845
*While responses to certain social categories have been included, small numbers of self-identified respondents within those categories prevent meaningful statistical analysis.								

The table above shows that if broken by social category, approval ('approve' and 'strongly approve' combined) remains very high for the same group of engagements. The lowest levels of approval came for inter-ethnic marriages from 'genocide survivors', but at 88.7% agreement to this most intimate level of engagement still remains substantially high.

**14.6. Primary and secondary sources of division in Rwandan society**

The last measurement in this section relates to the most divisive aspects of Rwandan society. The figure below shows how Rwandans have ranked different aspects of Rwandan society in terms of the division that they bring to the country.

**Figure 27: Primary and secondary sources of division in Rwandan society (%)**



The results show that economic status, ethnicity and political party membership are being regarded as the three primary sources of division in the country. It is of particular significance here that, in the eyes of ordinary Rwandans, economic inequality (30.4%) surpasses ethnic difference as a source of divisions (22%). Far lower down in the third place is the issue of differences between political parties. The latter has however featured most strongly as the most mentioned secondary source of division, with 15% of respondents mentioning this category. Income inequality, followed by ethnic divisions has been the second and third most mentioned secondary divisions. An interesting aspect of responses to this collection of options is that close to 24% of respondents could not identify a secondary source of division.

#### **14.7. Social Cohesion Summary Findings**

This section examined through RRB social cohesion as measure of horizontal reconciliation, with the hypothesis that if trust increases between Rwandan citizens, and particularly those on different side of the genocide, reconciliation is more likely to occur.

A descriptive analysis of the RBB data points to significant progress in terms of forging social cohesion in the wake of the genocide in 1994. It suggests a positive shift in inter-ethnic relations and interactions, and a considerable degree of willingness to engage in interactions with people from different ethnic groups. It appears, according to the data, as if this predisposition stems from an increase in trust of people from these different groups. The RBB also indicates that, contrary to popular belief, it is not ethnic-, but rather economic cleavages that are most divisive in Rwandan society today. Thirty percent of adult Rwandans responded that the gap between rich and poor is the primary source of division in society,

Obviously, the RRB came up with high levels of social cohesion indicators including social distance, tolerance and trust. For the majority of indicators used, scores go higher than 80% of positive perceptions, attitudes and behaviours. Based on these findings one can argue that the current state of social cohesion is a critical indicator that reconciliation in Rwanda is on good track. However, the gap between rich and poor, between those of different ethnic groups and that between members of political parties, in order of importance, remain the primary sources of division among Rwanda. The government of Rwanda, the Private sector and civil society organisations should endeavour to take up this challenge for fear of letting them (gaps) hinder the social cohesion and finally the reconciliation process.

## **XV CONCLUSION**

This first Rwandan reconciliation barometer (RRB) has been conducted 16 years after the genocide against the Tutsi and 11 years after the establishment of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. The new government set up after this genocide, and NURC in particular have embarked, among other things, on rebuilding the social fabric which was torn by ethnic and region-based divisions as well as the genocide. The RRB has investigated perceptions, attitudes and practices of the Rwandan citizens on progress in unity and reconciliation.

The tracking of the state of reconciliation in Rwanda was based on six variables. They include political culture, human security, citizenship and identity, transitional justice, understanding the past and social cohesion.

The following are major conclusions emerging from the RRB findings:

The first section examined political culture as an independent variable with the potential to explain reconciliation occurrence in Rwanda. All in all, for most indicators used except that on citizen participation, more than 70 % of responses suggest that citizens view political structures, institutions, values and leadership as legitimate and effective. It can therefore be argued that political culture in Rwanda, though not optimal yet, remains in a position to contribute positively to reconciliation process. However, much is still to be done especially in the area of boosting citizen participation in decisionmaking, and confidence in non-government-led frameworks/organisations such as political parties, civil society organisations, religious organisation, and private media.

Concerning human security, large majorities of Rwandans report high levels of physical security. In this regard the majority of respondents have also expressed positive sentiments towards the prospects for their personal economic circumstances, as well as the commitment of the state to support human development in an equitable and fair fashion. However, it has been apparent that respondents have more reservations about matters relating to economic security than is the case for physical security. There are good reasons to believe, from the above, that Rwandans have acceptable security grounds to move towards reconciliation, although there is still much to be done on economic side.

In relation with citizenship and identity, the RRB survey suggests that most of Rwandans (more than 90%) feel proud of being citizens of Rwanda, and want their children to think of themselves as Rwandan rather than hutu, tutsi or twa (98%). The feeling that common national values leading to reconciliation are being promoted in Rwanda today is also very high (94%), with most of Rwandans (96%) believing that in everyday life, the actions and behaviour of most Rwandans promote reconciliation. Given that large majority of Rwandans believe that reconciliation is a key national priority and that national values leading to reconciliation are being promoted, the likelihood that citizenship and identity contribute to bringing about reconciliation in Rwanda remains very significant.

As far as understanding the past is concerned, almost all Rwandans are with the view that before the genocide, the way history was taught and understood in Rwanda created divisions in society (98%), and that today, teaching and understanding of true Rwandan history encourages reconciliation (94.7%). Furthermore, majorities of Rwandans are with the view that many of Rwanda's conflicts can be blamed on ethnic manipulation (69.7%). The RRB also reports a significant belief that although it is against the law, some Rwandans would try to commit genocide again, if conditions were favourable (almost 40 %).

By and large, it is obvious that large majority of Rwandans share the view that history teaching and ethnic manipulation have significantly shaped the division among Rwandans. This common understanding of some aspects of the past, we can argue, is a good sign that the likelihood that Rwandan citizens can reconcile is high. However, the persisting fear-



among some Rwandans, mainly genocide survivors, old case refugees, and young people - of a genocide reoccurrence might hinder the reconciliation process, if concrete measures are not taken.

With regard to transitional justice, majorities of Rwandans (more than 80%) feel that they have experienced individual healing. This is based on occurrence of forgiveness seeking and giving, healing from the wounds of the past and experience of reconciliation in one's life. However, some Rwandans (34.5%) feel that engaging in reconciliation process is not a voluntary commitment, and that the attitude of some Rwandans suggests that they still want to take revenge for the events of the past (almost 26%).

On the question about who should reconcile with whom, Rwandans mentioned primarily and in order of importance genocide survivors and genocide perpetrators (48.4%); Rwandans and other Rwandans (33.2%); and Hutu and Tutsi (15%). A very high confidence in Gacaca as a transitional justice mechanism was also reported, especially in truth unveiling, punishment, impartiality of judges, etc. There is however less appreciation vis-à-vis the compensation for the genocide survivors.

All in all, for the majority of indicators used, more than 70 % of responses suggest high satisfaction with the justice that they received. This percentage is high enough to argue that transitional justice in Rwanda is in a better position to enhance reconciliation as suggested by the working hypothesis.

Regarding social cohesion, RBB data suggest tremendous progress in terms of forging social cohesion in the wake of the genocide in 1994. A positive shift in inter-ethnic relations and interactions, and a considerable degree of willingness to engage in interactions with people from different ethnic groups is very high, assumingly as a result of increase in trust of these people.

Contrary to popular belief, the survey shows that it is not ethnic primarily, but rather economic cleavages that are most divisive in Rwandan society today. Thirty percent of adult Rwandans responded that the gap between rich and poor is the primary source of division in society.

For the majority of indicators used, scores go higher than 80% of positive perceptions, attitudes and behaviours. Based on these findings, one can argue that the current state of social cohesion is a critical indicator that reconciliation process in Rwanda is on good track. However, the gap between rich and poor, the division between Rwandans from different ethnic groups and that between members of political parties, in order of importance, remain the primary sources of division among Rwandans.

It is important to emphasise that the results of the first RRB represent baseline measurements. The results therefore present a picture of where Rwanda currently finds itself in terms of national unity and reconciliation. They can however not be used to draw conclusions of trends or progress over time. In order to do this, more such surveys will need to be conducted in future.

### **Recommendations**

#### **I. Methodological recommendations (lessons learnt)**

1. Data collection for the first RRB were conducted on the eve of presidential campaign and after some mutual accusations between the government and some independent media and members of political opposition. Given that these events knew wide media coverage, it was assumed that they shaped to some extent the views/opinions of the Rwandan population including respondents to the RRB survey. In a bid to minimize the biases resulting from such influence, the timing of future RRB surveys should take this reality into consideration and, where possible, avoid data collection in months characterised by high political temperature.
2. RRB questionnaire included a number of sensitive questions. If the popular belief that “Rwandans do not open up immediately on most sensitive issues” is true, an exclusively quantitative approach would not be enough to collect citizen perceptions on reconciliation. A qualitative approach should be added to the latter for future RRB surveys to allow data collectors build more trust among respondents and therefore bring them to opening up and give their real views. Obviously, the combination of both approaches has an implication on the RRB surveys resources. NURC should bear this in mind in planning future RRB surveys.
3. During the data collection activity, local leaders at the village level were requested by researchers to collaborate with them in making the sampling frame (households) and in identifying physically the households. Such a presence and active involvement of local leaders could draw much attention from residents who were likely to take the research as government-supervised process, which could lead some of them to answer what they think would please the government. The National Institute of Statistics, thanks to the development of Information and Communication Technology in Rwanda, should endeavour to set up and regularly update a nationwide sampling frame (households) to be used by different researchers.
4. The RRB instrument has set baseline indicators for future surveys. However, due to maturation effect (changes in socio-political environment over the

time), NURC should endeavour to ensure a regular update of this instrument. This update could help track new indicators emerging from the environment, and drop out those deemed to no longer be of relevance.

## II. Policy-oriented recommendations

1. The inequality between rich and poor has been identified as the primary source of division in present day Rwanda. Effort made by the government of Rwanda to boost economic growth over the past years should go hand in hand with that of reducing the gap between rich and poor. Thus, poor-focused initiatives following the example of that of *Girinka Munyarwanda* (One cow one family programme) should be multiplied by both the government and civil society organisations.
2. Second on the list of sources of division is the difference between ethnic groups. In the same vein, important percentages of Rwandans (31.5%) feel that although ethnic discrimination is banned in Rwanda, it still occurs, and 30.5% feel that Rwandans still judge each other on the basis of ethnic stereotypes. This shows, as suggested by the RRB findings, that though Rwandan citizens are on good track of reconciliation process, much is still to be done to fill the gap created by ethnic divisions. The government of Rwanda should keep on ensuring that members of all Rwandan ethnic groups have equal chance to access public services such as education, employment, health, and to country's resources. Particularly, NURC should double its effort to fight against ethnic stereotypes based in the Rwandan culture (proverbs) and the daily sayings of Rwandans. Itorero, Ingando, schools (curricula for all levels) and Igorora can still be convenient frameworks and channels through which such a fight can operate. Religious denominations and civil society organisations should also double efforts for such an endeavour.
3. Political parties came in the third place as a source of division in Rwanda today. Since 1959 through 1991-1994 until now, political parties confrontations, especially between those in power and those on opposition side have thrown people in confusion and have contributed to a big extent to the division among the Rwandans. Mutual allegations between the government and emerging political opposition parties in Rwanda supports the above finding.
4. Political parties, irrespective of whether they are in opposition or not should abide by the law and commit to promote unity and reconciliation of the Rwandan people. They should avoid any speech, writing and behaviour of a sectarian nature or which can throw people in confusion.

5. About 40% of respondents declared that since the end of the genocide, access to land and housing worsened. Thirty percent (30%) disagree with the opinion that national resources are equitably distributed. The government should keep on enforcing the policies of grouped settlement, land consolidation and agricultural mechanisation. In collaboration with private sector and civil society organisations, the government should promote non-agricultural income generating activities. MINALOC in collaboration with, local governments, the Private sector and CSO's should double effort to build houses for those who do not have decent houses. Participants in Ingando, Itorero and Umuganda can also be very useful as far as manpower is concerned. Urban planning and expropriation policy should take into consideration the capacities of different socioprofessional categories, and therefore plan build sites accordingly with clear regulations to abide to.
6. Sensitive percentages of citizens feel that they do not have space to actively influence and shape policy and decision-making processes that happen within government and that affect their lives. Close to a third of all respondents disagree with the statement that they have "space and opportunities to influence those that make the laws of the country", and further third agree that they have "very little say in the important decisions" that affect their lives. Although Rwanda has high scores in many areas of good governance such as fighting against corruption, promotion of gender equality, attractive business doing environment, etc. the above finding suggests a lower score in citizen participation in decision-making. The government, the Parliament and local government should make tangible effort to involve citizens in decision-making. Consultations prior to making major decisions and setting key policies and laws that affect daily life of citizens can be one of participation mechanisms.

### III. Further research (sectorial research, qualitative...)

The RRB has exclusively used a quantitative approach. One shortcoming of this option is that the survey helped get estimates on current state of reconciliation in Rwanda without yielding relevant explanations on the "why" of many significant results. Further research studies, mainly from a qualitative approach, are therefore needed to take up this challenge. Findings from such studies should inform sectorial policies in terms of setting up and/or revision. Below are some suggested focuses for further research:

- Obstacles to citizen participation in decision-making
- Levels, forms, causes of ethnic discrimination and stereotypes, and strategies to eradicate them.

- Reasons behind lower trust in political parties, religious institutions, and civil society organisations (CSO's).
- It is established that the elite (political , intellectual and economic) played a key role in shaping ethnic conflict in Rwanda. The RRB survey suggested a significant percentage (48.7%) of Rwandans who believe that the conflicts between the elite within the political sphere have not been effectively managed. There is an urgent need to conduct a study involving the elite with a focus on reconciliation process.

This study encompasses tremendous data and opinions necessary to building true and lasting reconciliation as well as unity among Rwandans. The above mentioned recommendations are few of many that may be drawn from number of data and analyses made throughout the document. Reading systematically this document may be of great interest as this may inspire other sectorial and practical recommendations.

# ANNEXES

## RWANDA RECONCILIATION BAROMETER

**SAMPLING**

## Selected sectors, cells and villages

Province	District	Sector	Cell/Akagari	Village
				<b>Choice</b>
NORD	Burera	Bungwe	Mudugari	Mubuga
		Kagogo	Kiringa	Kirigari
		Rwerere	Ruchonsho	Kamatengu
	Gakenke	Busengo	Kamina	Kamina
		Kivuruga	Rugimbu	Mugari
		Rushashi	Mbogo	Gisanze
	Gicumbi	Bukure	Kivumu	Karushya Centre
		Mukarange	Mutarama	Mafunirwa
		Shangasha	Nyabishambi	Gasiza
	Musanze	Busogo	Nyagisozi	Cyasure
		Kinigi	Kampanga	Rubara
		Shingiro	Mudende	Nyarutende
	Rulindo	Base	Gatare	Mugendera 1
		Kisaro	Mubuga	Gako
		Tumba	Misezzero	Kavumu
SUD	Gisagara	Gikonko	Gikonko	Gahabwa
		Muganza	Remera	Agakurwe
		Save	Rwanza	Akarambo
	Huye	Gishamvu	Ryakibogo	Impinga
		Mbazi	Mwulire	Bumbogo
		Tumba	Gitwa	Nyarurembo
	Kamonyi	Gacurabwenge	Kigembe	Kagarama
		Musambira	Kivumu	Nyarenga
		Runda	Kagina	Gasharara
	Muhanga	Cyeza	Makera	Binunga
		Muhanga	Nyamirama	Namakurwe
		Shyogwe	Mubuga	Matsinsi
	Nyamagabe	Buruhukiro	Kizimyamuriro	Gikungu
		Kibumbwe	Kibibi	Gutandaganya
		Uwinkingi	Mudasomwa	Gicaca
	Nyanza	Busasamana	Kibinja	Ngorongari
		Kigoma	Gahombo	Birembo
		Rwabicuma	Mushirarungu	Kirwa
	Nyaruguru	Busanze	Nteko	Nyarukeri
		Munini	Ngeri	Akagera
		Rusenge	Mariba	Miko
	Ruhango	Bweramana	Murama	Karima
		Kinazi	Kinazi	Nyabinyenga

NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION

		Ruhango	Musamo	Ryanyiranda	
EST	Bugesera	Gashora	Kagomasi	Kuruganda	
		Mwogo	Rugunga	Rukira	
		Shyara	Nziranziza	Kagarama	
	Gatsibo	Gasange	Teme	Biburankwi	
		Kiziguro	Ndatemwa	Akamamesa	
		Rwimbogo	Nyamatete	Akajevuba	
	Kayonza	Gahini	Kiyenzi	Kabuye	
		Murundi	Murundi	Kayongo	
		Rwinkwavu	Mukoyoyo	Busasamana	
	Kirehe	Gahara	Nyagasenyi	Cyabihama1	
		Mahamba	Saruhembe	Gisenyi	
		Nyarubuye	Nyabitare	Rugarama	
	Ngoma	Gashanda	Munege	Gakuto	
		Murama	Mvumba	Mvumba	
		Zaza	Ruhembe	Kabeza	
	Nyagatare	Gatunda	Nyamirembe	Kajevuba	
		Mimuri	Mahoro	Cyabwana	
		Tabagwe	Nyabitekero	Kabeza	
	Rwamagana	Fumbwe	Nyamirama	Agatare	
		Munyaga	Rweru	Kabingo	
		Rubona	Karambi	Karambi	
	Karongi	Bwishyura	Kayenzi	Buhoro	
		Murambi	Nkoto	Kibamba	
		Twumba	Gitabura	Gatare	
	Ngororero	Bwira	Gashubi	Rugeshi	
		Kavumu	Nyamugeyo	Gatovu	
		Sovu	Musenyi	Gihonga	
	Nyabihu	Bigogwe	Kora	Kageri	
		Kintobo	Nyamugari	Kabagandu	
		Shyira	Mpinga	Mukaka	
	OUEST	Nyamasheke	Bushekeri	Ngoma	Keshero
			Karambi	Kabuga	Mugohe
			Shangi	Mugera	Bweranyange
Rubavu		Bugeshi	Kabumba	Bonde	
		Kanzenze	Nyamikongi	Kivugiza	
		Rugerero	Muhira	Gatebe 1	
Rusizi		Bugarama	Pera	Kiyovu	
		Kamembe	Kamashangi	Amahoro	
		Rwimbogo	Mushaka	Gakombe	
Rutsiro		Gihango	Kongo-Nil	Kandahura	
		Mukura	Kagusa	Bukeye	
		Rusebeya	Remera	Bihira	
MVK	Gasabo	Bumbogo	Ngara	Birembo	
		Kacyiru	Kamutwa	Urugero	
		Rutunga	Kabariza	Kabaliza	
	Kicukiro	Gahanga	Murinja	Nyamuharaza	
		Kanombe	Karama	Byimana	



		Nyarugunga	Nonko	Amahoro
	Nyarugenge	Gitega	Kigarama	Umurava
		Mageragere	Ntungamo	Nyabitare
		Rwezamenyo	Rwezamenyo 1	Abatarushwa

**RWANDA RECONCILIATION BAROMETER/ IGIPIMO CY'UBUMWE**  
**N'UBWIYUNGE MU RWANDA**

**QUESTIONNAIRE TO CITIZENS/ IKAYI Y'IBIBAZO BIGENEWE UMUTURAGE**

**INTERVIEWER TO FILL IN:**

**INTERVIEWER NAME/ IZINA RY'UBAZA**

: \_\_\_\_\_

**District (select one)/ Akarere :**

1	<b>BURERA</b>	11	<b>NYANZA</b>	21	<b>KARONGI</b>
2	<b>GAKENKE</b>	12	<b>NYARUGURU</b>	22	<b>NGORORERO</b>
3	<b>GICUMBI</b>	13	<b>RUHANGO</b>	23	<b>NYABIHU</b>
4	<b>MUSANZE</b>	14	<b>BUGESERA</b>	24	<b>NYAMASHEKE</b>
5	<b>RULINDO</b>	15	<b>GATSIBO</b>	25	<b>RUBAVU</b>
6	<b>GISAGARA</b>	16	<b>KAYONZA</b>	26	<b>RUSIZI</b>
7	<b>HUYE</b>	17	<b>KIREHE</b>	27	<b>RUTSIRO</b>
8	<b>KAMONYI</b>	18	<b>NGOMA</b>	28	<b>GASABO</b>
9	<b>MUHANGA</b>	19	<b>NYAGATARE</b>	29	<b>KICUKIRO</b>
10	<b>NYAMAGABE</b>	20	<b>RWAMAGANA</b>	30	<b>NYARUGENGE</b>

**VILLAGE NAME/UMUDUGUDU:** \_\_\_\_\_

**CELL NAME/AKAGARI:** \_\_\_\_\_

**SECTOR NAME/UMURENGE:** \_\_\_\_\_

**QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER/NUMERO Y'IKAYI Y'IBIBAZO:** \_\_\_\_\_

**FIELD SUPERVISOR CHECK:**

**UMWANYA W'UMUGENZUZI W'UBUSHAKASHATSI** \_\_\_\_\_

**Household Selection Procedure. Uko ingo zitoranywa**  
 (See interviewer's instructions book)

**INTRODUCTION/KWIMENYEKANISHA:**

Good day. My name is \_\_\_\_\_ and I am an independent researcher working with the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace in Kigali. We are studying the views of Rwandans on issues of reconciliation, national unity and good governance. We are conducting interviews with Rwandans in all of the thirty districts of this country. Your household was chosen randomly, by chance, and we would like to interview one person. All of the information you give us is completely confidential. This information will be combined with that provided by thousands of other Rwandans. There will be no way to identify your individual answers, so please feel free to tell us what you really think.

*Muraho. Nitwa,,,ndi umushakashatsi wigenga ukorera Ikigo cy'ubushakashatsi n'ubusabane bigamije amahoro gifite icyicaro i Kigali. Turakora ubushakashatsi bugamije kumenya icyo abanyarwanda batekereza ku bumwe n'ubwiyunge n'imiyoborere. Ubu bushakashatsi bukorerwa ku banyarwanda mu turere twose tw'u Rwanda. Urugo rwanyu rwatoranyijwe mu buryo bwa tombola kandi turifuza kugirana ikiganiro n'umuntu umwe wo muri uru rugo. Ibyo tunganira ntibizigera bitangazwa kw'izina ryawe, ahubwo bizashyirwa hamwe n'iby'abandi banyarwanda babazwa hatitawe kumazina y'ababitanze, Bityo rero ntugire impungenge zo kutubwiza ukuri ku byo utekereza.*

If you feel uncomfortable, you may refuse to answer any question, or end the interview at any time without any negative consequences.

*Nihagira ikibazo wumva udashaka gusubiza wacyihorera, nanone uramutse wumvise utagishaka gukomeza gusubiza, ntiwitinye nta ngaruka nimwe byakugiraho.*

	Male	Female
Previous interview was with a:	1	2
This interview must be with a:	1	2

**INTERVIEWER (Read out):** Now, let's begin the interview. First, I would like to start by asking you a few questions about yourself. *Reka noneho dutangire ikiganiro nyirizina. Ndatangira nkubaza ibibazo birebana nawe bwite.*

1. How old are you today? [WRITE IN][If respondent is under 18, stop interview and return to selection procedure]  
*Ufite imyaka ingaha?*

2. Which, if any, of the following religions do you associate yourself with?  
*Niba hari idini cg itorero ubamo ni irihe muri aya akurikira?*

Roman Catholic <i>Umugatulika</i>	1	Protestant <i>Umuporotestanti</i>	2	Seventh Day Adventist <i>Umudiventi</i>	3	Muslim <i>Umuyisilamu</i>	4
Born again <i>/Umurokore</i>	5	Other <i>Irindi</i>	6			Refused <i>Yanze</i>	98
Don't know <i>Ntaryo ngira</i>	99						

**POLITICAL CULTURE/GOVERNANCE /IMYOBORERE**

**TRUST IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS / icyizere mu nzego n'ibigo bya leta**

<p><b>Now, I would like to talk to you about public institutions. Please indicate how much confidence you have in the following institutions in Rwanda. Is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or none at all?</b></p> <p><i>Reka noneho tuganire ku nzego n'ibigo bya leta. Kuri buri rwego mu zo ngiye kugusomera wambwira uko icyizere urufitiye kingana. Ese ni cyinshi cyane, cyinshi, ntigihagije, ntacyo namba.</i></p>							
		A great deal <i>cyinshi cyane</i>	Quite a lot <i>cyinshi</i>	Not very much <i>ntigihagije</i>	None at all <i>ntacyo namba</i>	Refused <b>Yanze gusubiza</b>	Don't Know <b>Ntabizi</b>
3.	Parliament <i>Inteko Ishinga Amategeko</i>	4	3	2	1	98	99
4.	The justice system <i>Ubutabera muri rusange</i>	4	3	2	1	98	99
5.	Cabinet <i>Guverinoma/Abaminisitiri</i>	4	3	2	1	98	99
6.	Religious institutions <i>Amadini</i>	4	3	2	1	98	99
7.	Political parties <i>Amashyaka ya politiki</i>	4	3	2	1	98	99
8.	Local authorities <i>Abayobozi b'inzego z'ibanze</i>	4	3	2	1	98	99
9.	Civil society organisations <i>Imiryango n'amashyirahamwe bitari ibya leta</i>	4	3	2	1	98	99
10.	Community policing <i>Inzego z'abaturage zishinzwe umutekano</i>	4	3	2	1	98	99
<p><b>Now, I would like to talk to you about the media. Please indicate how much confidence you have in each of the following. Is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or none at all?</b></p> <p><i>Reka noneho tuvuge ku bitangamakuru . Wambwira uko ikizere ufitiye buri cyiciro cy'ibitangamakuru (cy'ibinyamakuru) bikurikira kingana? Ese ni Cyinshi cyane, ni cyinshi, ntigihagije, cyangwa ntacyo namba.</i></p>							
		A great deal <i>cyinshi cyane</i>	Quite a lot <i>cyinshi</i>	Not very much <i>ntigihagije</i>	None at all <i>ntacyo namba</i>	Refused <b>Yanze gusubiza</b>	Don't Know <b>Ntabizi</b>
11.	Public media (print and broadcast) <i>Ibitangamakuru bya Leta ( ibyandika , Radiyo na TV)</i>	4	3	2	1	98	99
12.	Private media (print and broadcast) <i>Ibitangamakuru byigenga ( ibyandika , Radiyo na TV)</i>	4	3	2	1	98	99
13.	<p><b>In your opinion, how much does the media in Rwanda today contribute to increasing reconciliation? Is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or none at all?</b></p> <p><i>Kubwawe, wumva itangamakuru rifite uruhare rungana iki mu guteza imbere ubwiyunge mu Rwanda? Ese ni rwinshi cyane, rwinshi , ntiruhagije , cyangwa ntarwo namba.</i></p>						
A great deal <b>Runini cyane</b>		Quite a lot <b>Runini</b>	Not very much <b>ntiruhagije</b>	None at all <b>Ntarwo namba</b>	Refused <b>Yanze gusubiza</b>	Don't Know <b>Ntabizi</b>	

4	3	2	1	98	99
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**TRUST IN LEADERSHIP/ICYIZERE MUBUYOBOZI**

Now, I would like to ask you about the political situation. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

*Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo ngiye kuvuga hepfo aha, Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, Ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera, cyangwa ntubyemera na mba*

		Strongly agree Ndabye mera cyane	Agree Ndabye mera	Neither Ntaho mpagaze	Disagree simbyemera	Strongly disagree Simbyemera na mba	Refused Yanze gusubiza	Don't know Ntabizi
14.	I can trust this country's leaders to do what is in my best interest. <i>Nizera ko abayobozi b'iki gihugu bakora ibiganisha kunyungu zanjye</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
15.	The country's leaders care about all people in Rwanda equally. <i>Abayobozi b'igihugu bita ku bantu bose kimwe</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
16.	I have space and opportunities to influence those that make the laws of the country. <i>Mfite uburyo bwanfasha kugera kubashyiraho amategeko no kuba natuma bashingira kubitekerezo byanjye</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
17.	I have very little say in the important public decisions that affect my life. <i>Nta ruhare rugaragara ngira mubyemezo by'ingenzi bireba imibereho yanjye nk'umunyarwanda</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

There are a number of ways that citizens can participate to influence the decisions of government. Please indicate which of the following activities you are willing to participate in.

*Hari inzira nyinshi abanyarwanda bashobora kunyuramo kugira ngo bagire uruhare mu byemezo bya guverinema. Wambwira, muri ibi bikorwa, icyo wumva wakwitabiira? Umbwire niba ari : Igihe cyose, rimwe na rimwe, cyangwa nta narimwe.*

		Always Buri gihe	Only under certain circumstances Rimwe na rimwe	Never Nta na rimwe	Refused Yanze gusubiza	Don't know Ntabizi
18.	Attend a community meeting <i>Kwitabira inama y'aho utuye</i>	3	2	1	98	99

19.	Get together with others to raise an issue <i>Kwishyira hamwe n'abandi ngo mwunvikanishe ikibazo</i>	3	2	1	98	99
20.	Voting in an election <i>Kujya gutora</i>	3	2	1	98	99
21.	Signing a petition <i>Gushyira umukono ku nyandiko rusange ifite icyo isaba ubuyobozi</i>	3	2	1	98	99
22.	Joining a boycott <i>Kwanga kwitabira ibyo utemeranya nabyo</i>	3	2	1	98	99
23.	Participating in a legal protest <i>Kujya mummyigaragambyo yemewe n'amategeko</i>	3	2	1	98	99

## HUMAN SECURITY /UMUTEKANO WA MUNTU

### Physical Security / KUDAHUTAZWA

Now I would like to ask you about security. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

*Reka noneho tunganire ibirebana n'umutekano. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo ngiye kuvuga hepfo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, Ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera, cyangwa ntubyemera na gato.*

		Strongly agree <i>Ndabye mera cyane</i>	Agree <i>Ndabye mera</i>	Neither <i>Ntaho mpagaze</i>	Disagree <i>simbye mera</i>	Strongly disagree <i>simbye mera na gato</i>	Refused <i>Yanze gusubiza</i>	Don't know <i>Ntabizi</i>
24.	My family and I do not fear any threat to our physical safety. <i>Yaba jye, yaba umuryango wanjye ntacyo dutinya twumva ko cyaduhutaza</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
25.	Overall, I am satisfied with my life today. <i>Muri rusange, nezerejwe n'imibereho mfite muri iki gihe</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
26.	It is unlikely that there will be any armed conflict within Rwandan borders anytime in the next few years. <i>Nta ntambara ishobora kongera kuba kubutaka bw'u Rwanda mu myaka mike iri imbere</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
27.	Rwanda is becoming a safer country to live in. <i>U Rwanda rurarushaho gutekana kuburyo rubereye guturwamo</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

<p><b>Now I would like to ask you about expressing your opinion. How comfortable do you feel expressing your true opinion in the following situations? Is it very comfortable, comfortable, neither comfortable nor uncomfortable, uncomfortable or very uncomfortable?</b></p> <p><i>Reka noneho nkubaze ibijyanye n'uburenganzira bwo gutanga ibitekerezo. Wumva ufite umutekano ungana iki mugutanga igitekerezo cyawe nyacyo mu bivugwa hepfo aha. Ese wavuga ko ari mwishi cyane, ari mwinshi, ko ntaho uhagaze, ko ntawo, cyangwa ko ari ntawo na mba</i></p>								
		Very comfortable Mwinshi cyane	Comfortable Mwinshi	Neither Ntaho mpagaze	Uncomfortable ntawo	Very uncomfortable Ntawo na mba	Refused Yanze gusubiza	Don't know Ntabizi
28.	Expressing your true opinions to your family and close friends <i>Kubwira igitekerezo cyawe nyacyo abavandimwe cyangwa inshuti</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
29.	Expressing your true opinions in public <i>Gutanga igitekerezo cyawe nyacyo mu ruhame</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
30.	Expressing your true opinions to a member of the media <i>Kubwira umunyamakuru igitekerezo cyawe nyacyo</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
<p><b>Economic security / <i>Umutekano w'umutungo</i></b></p> <p><b>Now, I would like to ask you about the economic situation. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree..</b></p> <p><i>Noneho ndashaka ko tunganira kubirebana n'umutekano w'ibintu byawe. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera cyangwa ntubyemera na gato</i></p>								
		Strongly agree Ndabyemera cyane	Agree Ndabyemera	Neither Ntaho mbagaze	Disagree Simbyemera	Strongly disagree Simbyemera na gato	Refused Yanze gusubiza	Don't know Ntabizi
31.	In Rwanda all people have an equal opportunity to make a living. <i>Mu Rwanda, abantu bose bafite amahirwe angana yo gukora icyababeshaho</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
32.	It is likely that I will lose my house or land in future. <i>Birashoboka ko natakaza cyangwa nabura inzu yanjye, cg</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

	<i>isambu mu myaka iri imbere</i>							
33.	All people benefit equally from government service delivery. <i>Abantu bose bahabwa serivisi za leta kuburyo bumwe</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
34.	In Rwanda all people have equal access to land. <i>Mu Rwanda, abantu bose bahabwa amahirwe amwe yo kubona ubutaka</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
35.	National resources are equitably distributed in Rwanda <i>Umutungo w'igihugu/ Ibyiza by'Igihugu bigera ku Bantu bose nta kuryamirana</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

### General security / *Umutekano rusange*

Please think back on the changes that have happened in Rwanda since 1994. For each of the following statements, would you say that things have improved a great deal, improved, stayed the same, worsened, or worsened a great deal?

*Na none, dushubije amaso inyuma, tukareba impinduka zabaye kuva muri 1994, wambwira uko ubona ibivugwa hepfo aha. Ese byateye imbere cyane, byateye imbere, nta cyahindutse, byasubiye inyuma, cyangwa byasubiye inyuma cyane.*

		Improve d a great deal <i>byateye imbere cyane</i>	Improve d <i>byateye imbere</i>	Stayed the same <i>nta cyahind utse</i>	Worsene d <i>byasubiy e inyuma</i>	Worsene d a great deal <i>byasubiy e inyuma cyane</i>	Refused <i>Yanze gusubiza</i>	Don't Know <i>Ntabizi</i>
36.	Your personal economic situation <i>Ubukungu bwawe bwite muri rusange</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
37.	Relations between different ethnic groups <i>Imibanire hagati y'amoko</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
38.	Family wellbeing <i>imibereho y'umuryango wawe</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
39.	Relations between people from different regional origins <i>Imibanire hagati y'abantu badaturuka hamwe</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
40.	Employment opportunities <i>Amahirwe yo kubona akazi</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
41.	Access to education <i>Kubona ishuri</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
42.	Your hope for the future <i>Icyizere cyawe cy' ejo hazaza</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
43.	Access to land <i>Kubona ubutaka</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

44.	Access to housing <i>Kubona inzu yo guturamo</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
45.	Security of national borders <i>Umutekano ku mbibi z'u Rwanda</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
46.	The situation of returnees in the country <i>Imibereho y'abahungutse bagaruka mugihugu</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
47.	The gap between rich and poor <i>Icyuho hagati y'abakire n'abakene</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

**What about the direction of the country overall? In terms of the following, would you say that the country is going in the right direction or the wrong direction, or are you undecided?**

*Kubirebana n'aho igihugu kigana muri rusange? Muri ibi bikurikira wavuga ko u Rwanda rugana aheza, rugana ahataraho, cg ntuhabona neza ?*

		Right direction	Undecided	Wrong direction	Refused	Don't know
48.	National reconciliation in Rwanda <i>Ubwiyunge mu banyarwanda</i>	3	2	1	98	99
49.	Democratic governance in Rwanda <i>Imiyoborere abanyarwanda bafitemo ijambo</i>	3	2	1	98	99

### **CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY / UBWENEGIHUGU n'IBIRANGA ABANTU**

#### **National Identity Ubunyarwanda**

**Now, I would like to ask you about being a citizen of Rwanda. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.**

*Reka none ho nkubaze kubijyanye n'ubunyarwanda. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera cyangwa ntubyemera na gato*

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Refused	Don't know
50.	I am proud to be a citizen of Rwanda. <i>Mfite ishema ryo kuba umunyarwanda</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
51.	In Rwanda, all citizens share common national values. <i>Mu Rwanda, abanyarwanda basangiye indangagaciro</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
52.	There are some Rwandans who see themselves as more Rwandan than others. <i>Hari abanyarwanda bumva ko barusha abandi ubunyarwanda</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
53.	Common national values leading to reconciliation are being promoted in Rwanda today	5	4	3	2	1	98	99



	<i>Mu Rwanda Indangagaciro ziganisha ku bumwe n'ubwiyunge ziratezwa imbere</i>							
54.	Most Rwandans believe that reconciliation is an important national priority. <i>Abanyarwanda hafi ya bose bumva ko ubwiyunge bw'abanyarwanda ari gahunda yihutirwa kandi y'ingenzi mu gihugu</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
55.	In everyday life, the actions and behaviour of most Rwandans promote reconciliation, <i>Mu buzima bwa buri munsu, ibikorwa n'imyitwarire by'abanyarwanda benshi biteza imbere ubwiyunge</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

**Individual Identity/ Ibiranga umuntu**

Now, I would like to ask you about yourself. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

*Reka noneho nkubaze kubikureba ubwawe. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera cyangwa ntubyemera na gato*

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Refused	Don't know
56.	I want my children to think of themselves as Rwandans, rather than Hutu, Twa or Tutsis. <i>Nifuzako abana banjye bajya bibona nk'abanyarwanda aho kwibona nk'abahutu, abatutsi, cyangwa abatwa.</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
57.	It is more important to identify oneself as Rwandan, than any other form of identity. <i>Igifite akamaro ni ukwibona nk'umunyarwanda kurusha ibindi byiciro umuntu yakwibonamo</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
58.	<b>Many people identify themselves in numerous different ways. Besides being Rwandan, what other group do you identify with most strongly? What group do you identify with second most strongly? INTERVIEWER: Read response options below aloud.</b> <i>Umuntu agira uburyo bwinshi yibonamo. Uretse kuba uri umunyarwanda, ni ikihe kiciro kindi wiyumvamo kurusha ibindi? Igukurikiraho se ni ikihe? MUSOMERE IBIKURIKIRA</i>							

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		Primary Kiza mbere	Secondary Kirakurikira
	Those who come from the same region as I do <i>Abo dukomoka( hamwe) mu gace kamwe</i>	1	1
	Those who belong to my ethnic group <i>Abo dusangiye ubwoko</i>	2	2
	Those who share my religious beliefs <i>Abo duhuje ukwemera ( mu iyobokamana)</i>	3	3
	Those who share my values <i>Abo dusangiye indangagaciro z'ingenzi</i>	4	4
	Those who study or work with me <i>Abo dukorana / twigana</i>	5	5
	Those who are of the same gender as I am <i>Ab'igitsina gabo/gore nka nje</i>	6	6
	Those who are the same age as I am <i>Urungano</i>	7	7
	Other <i>Ikindi</i>	8	8
	Refused <i>Yanze</i>	98	98
	Don't know <i>Simbizi</i>	99	99

Let's now turn to the question of equality of treatment of all citizens. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

*Reka noneho turebe niba kubwawe abanyarwanda bafatwa kimwe. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo bivugwa hefpo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera cyangwa ntubyemera na gato*

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Refused	Don't know
59.	All Rwandans are treated equally by the courts. <i>Abanyarwanda bose bafatwa kimwe imbere y'inkiko</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
60.	All Rwandans have an equal opportunity to get a job within the civil service. <i>Abanyarwanda bose bafite uburenganzira bungana muguhabwa akazi muri leta</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
61.	All Rwandans have an equal opportunity to access public tenders <i>Abanyarwanda bose bafite amahirwe angana muguhabwa amasoko ya leta</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

**UNDERSTANDING THE PAST / GUSOBANUKIRWA AMATEKA**

Now, I would like to discuss with you the events that took place in Rwanda in 1994. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

*Reka none ho tunganire kubyabaye mu Rwanda muri 1994. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera cyangwa ntubyemera na gato*

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Refused	Don't know
62.	Many of Rwanda's conflicts can be blamed on ethnic manipulation. <i>Ibibazo byinshi u Rwanda rufite bishingiye ku myumvire n'imikoreshereze mibi y'amoko</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
63.	Major issues related to conflict between Rwandans have been frankly discussed and understood <i>Ibibazo by'ingenzi birebana n'amakimbirane yabaye mu Rwanda hagati y'abanyarwanda byamaze kuganirwaho neza kandi byumvikanyweho.</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
64.	Before the genocide, the way history was taught and understood in Rwanda created divisions in society. <i>Mbere ya jenocide, uko amateka yigishwaga n'uko yumvikanaga byateye amacakubiri mu banyarwanda</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
65.	Conflicts between the elite within the political sphere have been effectively managed. <i>Amakimbirane hagati y'abanyepolitike yamaze gukemurwa neza</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
66.	Today, teaching and understanding of true Rwandan history encourage reconciliation. <i>Muri ikigihe, uko amateka y'u Rwanda yumvikana kandi yigishwa biratanga icyizere cy'ubwiyunge mu banyarwanda</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
67.	Although it is against the law, some Rwandans would try to commit genocide again, if	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

	conditions were favouring. <i>Nubwo bitemewe n'amategeko , hari abanyarwanda bashobora kuba bakora indi jenocide iyaba byabashobokeraga</i>							
<b>TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE/ UBUTABERA BW'INZIBACYUHO</b>								
<b>Individual Healing</b>								
I would now like to ask you about your personal feelings today. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree. <i>Reka na none nkubaze kubijyanye n'uko wiyumva. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera cyangwa ntubyemera na gato</i>								
		<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Refused</b>	<b>Don't know</b>
68.	I have forgiven those who hurt others in the past? <i>Namaze kubabarira abahemukiye abandi mu bihe byashize</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
69.	Many genocide perpetrators have shown remorse for their crimes. <i>Benshi mubakoze jenocide bagaragaje akababaro batewe n'ibyaha bakoze</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
70.	Those who did wrong in the past have sought forgiveness. <i>Abagize nabi mubihe byashize bamaze gusaba imbabazi</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
71.	The attitude of some Rwandans suggests that they still want to take revenge for the events of the past. <i>Hari abanyarwanda baba bagitekereza kwihorera kubera ibyababayeho mu bihe byashize</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
72.	I feel that I have healed from the wounds of the past. <i>Numva naramaze gukira ibikomere natewe n'ibyabaye mu mateka yahise</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
73.	I have no choice but to reconcile with others in my community, or face the consequences. <i>Nta mahitamo mfite, ni kwiyunga cg kwirengera ingaruka zo kutiyunga</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
74.	I personally have experienced reconciliation in my own life.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

	<i>Jyewe ubwanjye nabashije kwiwunga</i>							
75.	<p><b>Many people agree that reconciliation is important in Rwanda. In your opinion, in Rwanda today, who should be reconciling with whom?</b></p> <p><i>Abantu benshi basanga ko ubwiyunge ari ngombwa mu Rwanda. Kubwawe wumva ari nde ugomba kwiwunga nande?</i></p> <p>INTERVIEWER: DO NOT read out responses below. Code first response, then prompt with the following statement:  <b>NTUMUSOMERE IBISUBIZO BIKURIKIRA</b></p> <p><b>Are there any others who should be reconciling?</b></p> <p><b>Abakurikiraho se ni bande?</b></p> <p>INTERVIEWER: Code <u>second</u> response.</p>							
							<b>Primary</b>	<b>Secondary</b>
	Rwandans and other Rwandans <i>Abanyarwanda hagati yabo</i>						1	1
	Genocide perpetrators and genocide survivors <i>Abakoze jenocide hamwe n'abacitse ku icumu rya jenocide</i>						2	2
	Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups <i>Abahutu n'Abatutsi</i>						3	3
	Civil society organisations and citizens <i>Imiryango itegamiye kuri leta hamwe n'abanyarwanda</i>						4	4
	Old case refugees and other Rwandans <i>Abahungutse ba 1959 hamwe n'abandi banyarwanda</i>						5	5
	Citizens and leaders <i>Abayoborwa n'abayobora</i>						6	6
	Leaders between themselves <i>Abayobozi hagati yabo</i>						7	7
	Rwandan government and the international community <i>Ubuyobozi bw'u Rwanda hamwe n' Amahanga</i>						8	8
	Other <i>Abandi</i>						9	9
	Refused <i>Yanze</i>						98	98
	Don't Know <i>Simbizi</i>						99	99

### Justice / *Ubutabera*

As you know, one of the main ways that Rwandans pursued justice and reconciliation after the genocide was through gacaca courts. I would now like to ask you about your opinion of the gacaca courts. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

*Nk'uko mubizi, bumwe mu buryo bukomeye abanyarwanda bakoresheje bagana ku butabera n'ubwiyunge ni Inkiko Gacaca. Ndifuzza kukubaza icyo utekereza ku nkiko gacaca. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha: mbwira niba ubyemera cyane, ubyemera, ntaho uhagaze, utabyemera, cyangwa utabyemera na gato.*

		<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Refused</b>	<b>Don't know</b>
76.	The truth about the genocide in Rwanda, as it really happened, was revealed through gacaca	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

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	courts. <i>Ukuri nyako kubyabaye muri jenocide kwabashije kumenyekana kubera inkiko Gacaca.</i>							
77.	Inyangamugayo were impartial in the gacaca process. <i>Mu guca imanza, Inyangamugayo z'Inkiko Gacaca ntizabogamye ( zararamaga)</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
78.	Those who were convicted through gacaca received fair punishment. <i>Abagize uruhare muri Jenocide babonye ibihano bikwiriye</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
79.	Those convicted through gacaca who have served their sentences have been successfully reintegrated into Rwandan society. <i>Abakatiwe na gacaca bakarangiza ibihano byabo bashoboye gusubira mubuzima busanzwe muburyo bukwiye</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

Now I would like to ask you about some of the other initiatives and efforts to bring about justice and reconciliation in Rwanda. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

*Reka nkubaze kubirebana n'ibindi bikorwa /gahunda zigamije kuzana ubutabera n'ubwiyunge mu Rwanda. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha, mbwira uti : Ndabyemera cyane, Ndabyemera, Ntaho mpagaze, Ndabihakanye, mbihakanye nivuye inyuma*

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Refused	Don't know
80.	Genocide survivors have been compensated for the crimes committed against them. <i>Abacitse ku icumu rya jenocide bahawe indishyi kubera ibyaha bakorewe</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
81.	Genocide will never occur again in Rwanda, because the underlying causes have been dealt with. <i>Nta jenocide izongera kuba mu Rwanda kuko Impamvu za yiteje zitakiriho.</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
82.	Survivors of the genocide have received enough support and assistance from government. <i>Leta yahaye abacitse ku icumu</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

	<i>rya jenocide inkunga zihagije</i>							
83.	Those whose properties/assets had been abusively taken from them (1959 and 1994) have recovered them  <i>Imitungo yari yarabohojwe yasubijwe ba nyirayo yose</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
84.	Land redistribution after 1994 has lowered land related issues  <i>Isaranganya ry'amasambu ryagabanyije ibibazo bishingiye ku butaka</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
85.	Land redistribution after 1994 impacted positively social cohesion  <i>Isaranganya ry'amasambu ryateje imbere imibanire myiza mu baturage</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

**Please tell me your impressions of the effectiveness of each of the following. Are they very effective, effective, neither effective nor ineffective, ineffective, or very ineffective?**

*Mbwira uko ubona imikorere y'Urukiko mpuzamahanga rwashyiriweho u Rwanda ruba Arusha (Tanzania) Ese ni myiza cyane, myiza, ntaho uhagaze, mibi, mibi cyane?*

		Very Effective	Effective	Neither	Ineffective	Very Ineffective	Refused	Don't know
	The International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda <i>Imikorere y'Urukiko mpuzamahanga mpanabyaha rwashyiriweho u Rwanda, ( ruri Arusha)</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

### **SOCIAL COHESION / IMIBANIRE**

**In the past, many Rwandans experienced discrimination and prejudice on the basis of their ethnic origins. After the genocide Rwandans agreed that this should never happen again. We would like find out what progress we have made as a country in this regard. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.**

*Mu bihe byashize, abanyarwanda benshi bagiye bagirirwa ivangura rishingiye ku bwoko. Nyuma ya jenocide, abanyarwanda bumvikanye ko ibi bitagomba kuzongera kubaho ukundi muri iki gihugu. Turifuza kumenya intambwe u Rwanda rwateye muri uru rwego. Muri ibi bikurikira mbwira niba ubyemera cyane, ubyemera, ntaho uhagaze, utabyemera, cyangwa utabyemera na gato.*

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Refused	Don't know
86.	I have never experienced ethnic prejudice in Rwanda since the end of the genocide. <i>Kuva jenoside yarangira ntavangura rishingiye ku ubwoko ndakorerwa.</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
87.	Although ethnic discrimination is banned in Rwanda, it still occurs. <i>Nubwo ivangura rishingiye ku ubwoko ribujijwe mu Rwanda, riracyaboneka.</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
88.	Rwandans still judge each other on the basis of ethnic stereotypes. <i>Abanyarwanda baracyareberana mu ndorerwamo z'ubwoko</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
<p><b>Since 1994, some social relationships in Rwanda may have changed. Thinking about the present time, how often do you do each of the following? Is it always, often, sometimes, rarely or never?</b>  <i>Kuva muri 1994, hari imwe mu imibanire hagati y'abanyarwanda ishobora kuba yarahindutse. Muri iki gihe cyane, ni kangahe ukora ibi bikurikira? Ni buri gihe, kenshi, rimwe na rimwe, gake cyane, nta na rimwe?</i></p>								
		Always	Often	Some-times	Rarely	Never	Refused	Don't know
89.	Assist someone from another ethnic group materially or financially. <i>Guha umuntu mudahuje ubwoko inkunga/intwengerano y'igikoresho cyangwa amafaranga</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
90.	Receive financial assistance or material support from someone from another ethnic group <i>Kwakira inkunga/intwengerano y'igikoresho cg amafaranga uyihawe n'umuntu mudahuje ubwoko</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
91.	Borrow a tool or use a service from someone from a different ethnic group in your community <i>Gutira igikoresho cg gusaba servise ku muntu mudahuje ubwoko mu gace utuyemo</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
92.	Lend a tool or give a service to	5	4	3	2	1	98	99



	someone from a different ethnic group in your community. <i>Gutiza igikoresho cg guha servise umuntu mudahuje ubwoko mugace utuyemo</i>							
<p><b>After the genocide, Rwandans from different sides of the conflict had to learn to trust one another. Thinking about Rwanda today, to what extent would you agree with the following statements? Do you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree?</b></p> <p><i>Nyuma ya jenocide, abanyarwanda bo muruhande rwiciwe no m'uruhande rw'abicaga bagombaga kwiga kwongera kwizerana. Murebye aho tugeze muri iyi minsi, ku byo ngiye kugusomera, mbwira niba ubyemera cyane, ubyemera, ntaho uhagaze, utabyemera, utabyemera na gato.</i></p>								
		<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Refused</b>	<b>Don't know</b>
93.	Since 1994, relations have improved between those who found themselves on different sides of the genocide. <i>Kuva nyuma ya jenocide ya 1994, imibanire hagati y'uruhande rw'abahigwaga n'urwabahigaga imaze gutera imbere</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
94.	It is difficult for me or my family to trust Rwandans who found themselves on the other side of the conflict during the genocide <i>Biragoye haba kuri njye cg umuryango wanjye kugira ngo twizere bariya tutari ku ruhande rumwe igihe cya jenocide</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
95.	Rwanda's past still divides its people today. <i>Amateka y'u Rwanda aracya tandukanya abanyarwanda.</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
<p><b>How comfortable would you feel in the following situations? Would you feel very comfortable, comfortable, neither comfortable nor uncomfortable, uncomfortable or very uncomfortable?</b></p> <p><i>Wumva waba ufite umutekano ungana ute mugukora ibi ngiye kugusomera. Ese ubona umutekano wawe waba ari mwinshi cyane, mwinshi, ntaho uhagaze, muke, muke cyane.</i></p>								
		<b>Very comfortable</b>	<b>Comfortable</b>	<b>Neither</b>	<b>Uncomfortable</b>	<b>Very uncomfortable</b>	<b>Refused</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
96.	Asking a favour from a neighbour of a different ethnic group. <i>Gusaba umuturanyi mudahuje ubwoko kugira icyo agufasha</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
97.	Having an intimate friend from another ethnic group. <i>Kugira inshuti magara yo mu bundi bwoko</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

98.	Joining an association/cooperative made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group. <i>Kujya mw'ishyirahamwe/ umuryango wiganjemo abo mudahuje ubwoko</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
99.	Joining a political party made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group. <i>Kujya mw'ishyaka rigizwe n'abanyamuryango benshi bava mu bundi bwoko</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
100.	Joining a church congregation made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group. <i>Kujya mw'idini/itorero rigizwe n'abayoboke benshi bava mu bundi bwoko</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

**To what extent would you approve the following situations? Would you strongly approve, approve, neither approve nor disapprove, disapprove, or disapprove strongly?**

***Ibi bikurikira ubyemera ku gipimo kingana iki? Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera, cyangwa ntubyemera na mba?***

		Strongly approve	Approve	Neither	Disapprove	Strongly disapprove	Refused	Don't know
101.	Owning and operating a business with someone from another ethnic group. <i>Gufatanya ubucuruzi n'umuntu wo mu bundi bwoko</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
102.	Working for and taking instructions from someone from another ethnic group <i>Gukorera umuntu cg gutegekwa n'umuntu wo mu bundi bwoko</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
103.	Voting for someone from another ethnic group. <i>Gutora umuntu mudahuje ubwoko</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
104.	Marrying or having a close relative marry someone from another ethnic group <i>Gushaka umufasha (umugore/umugabo) cg kugira umuvandimwe washaka umufasha mudahuje ubwoko</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
105.	Leaving my child, or the child of a family member, in the care of	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

	someone from another ethnic group <i>Gusiga umwana wawe cg uw'umuvandimwe wawe ku muturanyi/umuntu mudahuje ubwoko</i>							
<p><b>To what extent do you agree with the following statement? Do you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree?</b>  <i>Wambwira niba wemera cyane, wemera, ntaho uhagaze, utemera cyangwa utemera na gato ibi bikurikira?</i></p>								
106.	In Rwanda, all groups enjoy equal rights <i>Mu Rwanda abantu b'ibyiciro byose bafite uburenganzira bungana</i>	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
107.	<p><b>In your opinion, what is the biggest division in Rwanda today, if any? Apart from this one, what would you say is the second biggest division in Rwanda today?</b>  <i>Kubwawe usanga ari iki gitandukanya abanyarwanda kurusha ibindi? Ubona icya kabiri ari ikihe? INTERVIEWER: Code first mention and second mention. Andika icya mbere mu mwanya wacyo n'icya kabiri mu mwanya wacyo</i></p>							
							<b>First mention</b>	<b>Second mention</b>
	The division between rich and poor <i>Icyuho hagati y'abakire n'abakene</i>						1	1
	The division between those of different ethnic groups <i>Amoko</i>						2	2
	The division between members of different religions <i>Amadini</i>						3	3
	The division between those of different linguistic backgrounds <i>Indimi</i>						4	4
	The division between supporters of different political parties <i>Amashyaka ya politiki</i>						5	5
	The division between different regions <i>Amacakubiri ashingiye aho umuntu aturuka</i>						6	6
	Other <i>Ikindi</i>						7	7
	No division <i>Nta na kimwe</i>						8	8
	Refused <i>Yanze</i>						98	98
	Don't know <i>Ntabizi</i>						99	99
<p><b>We are now coming to the end of our interview. I would just like to ask you a few more questions about yourself.</b>  <i>Ubu turi hafi yo gusozwa ikiganiro cyacu. Gusa ndifuza kukubaza utundi tubazo dukeya.</i></p>								
108.	<p><b>What is the highest level of education you received?</b>  <i>Ni ikihe cyiciro cya nyuma cy'amashuri wize?</i></p>							
	None <i>Ntayo</i>	Primary <i>Abanza</i>	Some secondary	Completed secondary	Vocational <i>Ay'imyuga</i>	Tertiary <i>Amakuru</i>	Refused <i>Yanze</i>	

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		<i>Sinarangije ayisumbuye</i>	<i>Narangije ayisumbuye</i>			
1	2	3	4	5	6	98
<b>109.</b>	<b>How would you describe your current employment status?</b> <i>Ukora iki?</i>					
	Unemployed, not looking for work <i>Nta kazi, nta n'ako nshaka</i>					1
	Unemployed, looking for work <i>Ndigushakisha akazi</i>					2
	Employed in the formal sector <i>Akazi gahamye</i>					3
	Employed in the informal sector <i>Akazi ko kwirwanaho</i>					4
	Self-employed <i>Ndikorera</i>					5
	Agricultural worker <i>Umuhinzi-mworozi</i>					6
	Retired <i>Ndi mu kiruhuko cy'izabukuru</i>					7
	Unable to work/disabled <i>Naramugaye</i>					8
	Housewife <i>Umugore wo murugo</i>					9
	Student <i>Umunyeshuri</i>					10
	Refused <i>Yanze</i>					98
<b>110.</b>	<b>In which of the following categories do you find yourself most?</b> <i>Muri ibi byiciro by'abanyarwanda ni ikihe wibonamo kurusha ibindi?</i>					
	Genocide survivors <i>Abarokotse jenocide</i>					1
	Relatives of genocide suspects/perpetrators <i>Abavandimwe b'abakekwaho jenocide cyangwa abahamwe n'icyaha cya jenocide</i>					2
	Tigistes <i>Uwakoze/ukora igihano nsimburagifungo</i>					3
	Old case refugees (1959) <i>Impunzi za kera zatahutse , zarizarahunze 1959</i>					4
	New case refugees (1994 and after) <i>Impunzi za vuba zatahutse, zari zarahunze 1994 cg nyuma y'aho</i>					5
	Historically marginalised people <i>Abasigajwe inyuma n'amateka</i>					6
	Refused <i>Yanze</i>					98
	Other <i>Ikindi (Utarahunze kandi utarishe, udafite umuvandimwe uregwa genocide, utari umucikacumu)</i>					99
<b>Have you ever attended any of the following programme conducted by NURC</b> <i>Wigeze ujya muri gahunda zikurikira zitegurwa na Komisiyo y'Ubumwe n'Ubwiyunge?</i>						

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		Yes	No	
111.	INGANDO	1	2	
112.	ITORERO	1	2	